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The present study explores the nature and structure of spiritual and aesthetic experiences 
through the interdisciplinary application of neurophenomenology (NP). This approach merges 
aspects of psychology, neurophysiology, and phenomenology into a unified methodology. The 
study is nested within a larger project, Space, Science, and Spirituality, and as such, it carries a 
common goal to use simulation to evoke spiritual and aesthetic responses similar to those 
expressed by astronauts and cosmonauts. Careful analysis of previous work in NP provided 
methodological “lessons learned”, which guided the experimental design, execution, and analysis 
of the present study. The data collected provides support for experience as a phenomenon that 
can be studied through empirical means. Further, the articulation of spiritual and aesthetic 
experiences akin to astronaut experiences corresponds to specific neurological and psychological 
indicators. Among those indicators are differences in EEG measures during simulation time 
relative to expressions of spiritual experience following the simulation and changes in visual 
processing across theta, alpha, and beta signals as correlated with self-identification. These 
findings support an embodied theory of experience that incorporates memory, executive 
function, perception, and consciousness. In addition to its academic contribution, this research 
holds implications for commercial space flight, long-term space missions, post-traumatic stress 
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CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW 
 “Now the man who is puzzled and wonders apparently does not know. Hence wonder is 
the movement of the man who does not know on his way to finding out, to get at the bottom of 
that at which he wonders and to determine its cause.... Such is the origin of philosophy” --From 
the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas's teacher, Albert the Great, 
as quoted by Greenblatt, 1990.     
Introduction 
The tension of exploration is often both push and pull; it lures outward, across seas or 
solar systems, and yet inward, into the depths of Earth and the depths of minds. The present 
study balances on this tension, with the inward-facing topic of the mind studied through the 
outward-facing expanse of space. Through this study, the nature of human experience is explored 
using techniques of neurophenomenology (NP). 
In this chapter, the purpose for the present study will be articulated. The problem 
statement will position the present study in the scope of current trends in neuroscience, 
specifically the NP approach. Then, the justifications for the study will be stated, emphasizing 
the importance of the neurophenomenological approach in the study of human cognition. 
Research objectives will offer direction for the present study and serve as markers for successful 
completion. Research hypotheses will be listed to indicate the expectations for the research 
outcomes. Definitions for key terms will provide a foundational lexicon to explore critical 
constructs. Before closing, the impact of the results on neuroscience will be discussed, providing 




The purpose for the present study is to assess neurophenomenological methods for 
studying first-person cognitive experiences. The study examines the techniques employed within 
previous experiments and adapts the methods used in a baseline experiment, Space, Science, & 
Spirituality (a title shared with the project as a whole). To avoid confusion, the term “baseline” 
will be used to refer to the first experiment in the project, and “the present study” will be used to 
refer to the work presented herein. That baseline acted as a reference point from which detailed 
recommendations for neurophenomenological experimentation were made. The present study 
includes an experiment, Viewing Earth from Space: First-Person Experiences, in which the 
methodological recommendations were applied. The goal for the experiment was two-fold. First, 
the experiment examined the use of a simulated environment to elicit spiritual and aesthetic 
experiences. Second, the experiment provided a “proof of concept” through which the 
methodological recommendations derived from studying the baseline experiment were applied. 
The overarching aim was to contribute empirically through the merit of the experiment itself to 
the corpus of academic work regarding the study of mind and theoretically to the refinement of 
NP as an approach for studying human experience.    
Problem Statement 
 While the nature of human experience has been explored throughout time, there is no 
consensus in the scientific community regarding methods to approach such inquiries. NP is one 
approach with promise, as its core purpose is to connect research in the various fields that study 
experience in a manner that fully integrates first-person experiential accounts. However, as a 
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fledgling approach, the neurophenomenological methods have yet to be articulated and applied 
consistently across research projects.  
NP is an approach to the study of mind that seeks to identify and explain the nature and 
structure of experience. To formulate the experiential data, NP uses techniques from cognitive 
science, neuroscience, and philosophy in an attempt to piece together a dynamic and inclusive 
picture (Gallagher & Varela, 2003; Thompson, Lutz, & Cosmelli, 2005; Varela, 1996).  
The present research focuses on the use of neurophenomenological methods to examine 
spiritual and aesthetic experiences akin to those reported by astronauts and cosmonauts. 
Researchers used an immersive simulation to display images of the earth from space in an 
attempt to elicit awe, wonder, curiosity, and humility (AWCH). The experiment tested the 
efficacy of methods, refined from a prior baseline study and other NP studies. The results from 
the experiment were evaluated both for their inherent value to the study of human experience and 
for their contribution to the improvement of neurophenomenological methods. The present work 
will provide direction for further neurophenomenological investigation. 
Background of Problem 
In 1961, Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin became the first human to venture into space and the 
first of us to know, firsthand, something of life beyond the blue marble. Since then, other men 
and women have followed, and in doing so they have entered into a distinguished population 
marked by the shared experience of outer space. The rare and remarkable experiences of 
astronauts have captured the imaginations of millions for half a century, inspiring movies, comic 
books, theme parks, and even Barbie dolls, as generations have matured knowing that they too 
could grow up to be astronauts. However, imagining what it is like to be an astronaut is very 
different from genuinely considering what an astronaut experiences. The former may involve 
4 
 
reflection upon the training required to become an astronaut, the skill sets used in a spaceflight, 
or the task demands while conducting science in low gravity. The latter involves the feelings and 
thoughts inherent to the distance, darkness, and oddities of space. To know another’s experience 
requires an understanding of an inner world, but it would be erroneous to assume that the hidden 
world of experience is impermeable. In the case of astronauts, they share some of that inner 
world when they return from their time in space with journals full of experiential reports; these 
first-person data sources are often tales of transformation and spiritual change.  
First-person data can be examined through multiple disciplinary lenses. Experience can 
be studied by examining psychometrics, that is, the results of questionnaires and surveys 
designed to examine experience using the traditional methods of cognitive psychology. It can be 
studied in terms of neuroscience, looking closely at brain behaviors to ascertain correlates of 
experience. First-person data can be collected in freely-generated and unique-to-the-individual 
forms (e.g. journals or interviews), and then analyzed through phenomenological techniques. By 
applying the methods of psychology, neuroscience, and phenomenology in an integrated fashion, 
researchers can develop a clearer picture of the nature and structure of experience. 
The present study explores the nature of astronaut experiences, religious, spiritual, and 
aesthetic, with an emphasis on AWCH. This study is one part of a larger interdisciplinary 
project, which began with hermeneutic analysis of astronaut journals and interviews and 
included a baseline study using a mixed-reality simulation environment.  
Legacies and limitations 
Human experience, broadly, has been examined through three distinct lenses. The 
following section includes an overview of pertinent approaches from psychology, neuroscience, 
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and philosophy. The purpose of the present section is to provide a general sense of both how and 
why each discipline approaches the problem of experience in its own way.  
Psychology’s lens on experience 
While the precise historical division between psychology and philosophy may be 
debatable, many historians of science point to Wilhelm Wundt for establishing a foundation for 
experimental psychology and with it the model of physiological psychology that would lead to 
behaviorism (Titchener, 1921) and the information processing model of cognition. To examine 
the inner world of the subject, Wundt relied heavily upon introspection, setting precedence in 
psychology for the management of first-person data. 
Gallagher and Sørenson (2006) distilled the tradition of introspection in psychology by 
drawing a distinction between the “weak” and “strong” uses of introspection in research. The 
first sense, the weaker one according to the authors, is the sort of introspection used in the design 
of experiments in which the participant is expected to indicate something in response to a 
stimulus. For example, a participant may be told, “Click the mouse as soon as you hear the bell.” 
In a very weak sense, this is introspection. From the participant’s perspective, it is “happening to 
me” and therefore it is a first-person report of experience. However, the weak form of 
introspection is problematic for multiple reasons. It is a response to a state, in some sense, but 
does it require any attention turned inward to the experience? Does it indicate anything of the 
experience of hearing the bell? This form of introspection has advanced our understanding of 
cognition, particularly in information processing models (Simon, 1979), by presenting processes 
of a sort that fit into stimulus-response cycles. Nonetheless, it tells us nothing of what it is like to 
experience the sound of the bell. 
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In contrast to “weak” introspection, there is a stronger sense of introspection (Gallagher 
& Sørensen, 2006). In this sense, introspection is a mental operation that makes self-reporting 
possible (Zahavi, 2003). Subjects may report, in their own words, what they have experienced, 
and they may do so in rich and insightful detail. This form of introspection has helped 
researchers understand much of individual differences, contributing to a picture of human 
experience that is diverse and complex. However, it still falls short of saying anything about the 
actual nature of an experience. Therefore, while a psychologist may use the strong form of 
introspection to get at a unique description of an individual’s thoughts and feelings, it too falls 
short of saying anything about the structure of an experience. If an experience is something to be 
examined, one ought to explore its components, the factors that constitute its essential features. 
However, introspection, even in this stronger sense, can only give an image of a private inner-
sense and cannot ultimately describe the “invariant self-organizing structure of the experience” 
(Gallagher & Sørensen, 2006, p. 121). 
Introspection, though not sufficient on its own, can contribute to the study of astronaut 
spiritual and aesthetic experiences. The caution is to take what can be reliably learned from first-
person psychological reports and use them with discretion as a valuable, not exclusive, source of 
observation. Like all tools, it must be wielded properly. The present study relied upon surveys 
that touched on complementary aspects of spiritual and aesthetic experience and developed a 
custom survey to examine these constructs more deeply. To study such abstract and challenging 
experiences, the metric must comply with excellent test design. This means that to effectively 
study the subject (in this case, experience) the test makers must consider question order, word 
choice, question format, and even number scale options, as all of these have been shown to 
influence the outcome of questionnaires (Schwarz, 1999). If the design of the survey adequately 
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reduces error, it may indicate something about the unique experience of the participant that can 
be linked to corresponding neurological and phenomenological data. For the present study, an 
experiment specific survey of experience (ESSE) explicitly defined the constructs under study 
and was administered after the phenomenological interview (described in detail in Chapter Two) 
to avoid priming. The ESSE and other surveys provided connections between the neural 
behaviors and the phenomenologically-derived categories. 
Neuroscience’s lens on experience 
Adding to the psychological picture of experience, neuroscience provides ways to 
consider the biological features of experience. A tremendously broad term, neuroscience 
encompasses numerous tools, theories, and techniques for examining the nervous system. 
Progress in neural imaging, biochemistry, electrophysiology, and machine computation has 
advanced the study of the brain and its functions. Interdisciplinary collaborations across the social 
and behavioral sciences and neuroscience have supported better understanding about the dynamic 
networks emerging between brains, bodies, and the world. Still, the emphasis of neuroscience is 
neural. It examines the nervous system at work. Some studies involve single-unit recording 
(capturing the firing of a specific neuron using a micro-electrode), helping to refine brain-
mapping. However, these techniques are invasive and significantly limit experimental design. 
Less invasive techniques include functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which provides 
images of hemodynamic change, depending on evidence that cerebral blood flow corresponds 
with neural activity. This approach also has limitations. Compromises in temporal resolution (i.e. 
a change in blood flow takes more time than the action potential measured by the aforementioned 
single-unit recording) and experimental design options (participants must be immobilized within 
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a fMRI machine) do not make it an ideal candidate for the examination of human experience 
(except, perhaps, if one was to examine the experiences associated with receiving an fMRI). 
There are options that can capture high temporal resolution while accommodating comfort 
and movement. Electroencephalography (EEG) captures electrical neural activity with high 
temporal resolution and wireless units (as the one used in the present study) that allow subjects 
mobility, thereby making an excellent tool for collection of neural data during cognition 
experiments. Further, functional near-infrared (fNIR) sensors collect hemodynamic oxygenation 
with minimal limitations on mobility. When placed on the forehead, these devices can collect 
information from the frontal lobes, with no more interference than an ordinary headband (Ayaz, 
Izzetoglu, Bunce, Heiman-Patterson, & Onaral, 2007; Chance et al., 1998). These tools can 
capture information about the areas of the brain that are activated, as well as electrical activity 
types (in brainwave frequencies) during experimental conditions. 
Even with excellent data collection tools, the limitations of psychology are echoed in 
neuroscience. One still must ask, does this data tell us anything about the experience? It certainly 
says something about the body during stimulus presentation. However, one must remember that 
the subject of study is not the participant; it is not the experiencer at the center of the 
examination, but the experience. At best, the neurological data can be correlated with the 
psychological data to suggest neural areas and brainwaves associated with certain states. Does 
this tell us what awe is? Does this direct us toward the structure of wonder? Neuroscience 
certainly provides a portion of the story, a piece of the biological mechanics that make experience 




 Philosophy’s lens on experience 
There is another lens through which researchers may examine spiritual and aesthetic 
experiences like those experienced by astronauts. Philosophy, broadly, has considered all things 
pertinent to human consciousness, but one branch (if one may consider it such) has leveraged its 
own rigorous methods to study experience in depth. Phenomenology, with its traditions of 
systematic analysis, uses methods for examining consciousness that both challenge and 
complement the methods of psychology and neuroscience.  
The philosophical heritage of Edmund Husserl launched a study of consciousness, 
including phenomenality, which took seriously the descriptive challenge of experience. Building 
on Husserl’s tradition, Martin Heidegger (1927) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002) brought 
perception and aspects of embodied interaction to the forefront. By the end of the 20
th
 century, 
neurobiologist Francisco Varela had incorporated these philosophically-derived methods for 
investigating cognition into the study of mind, commencing neurophenomenology (NP) (Varela, 
1996). 
Varela merged the phenomenological method with neuroscience experimentation, in an 
attempt to bridge cohesively neurophysiological data and first-person reports. An iconic example 
of the neurophenomenological approach examined experience during a visual perception task. 
Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, and Varela (2002) presented participants with a 2D image of dots. 
The participants looked at the image for seven seconds, and then the dots began to move, until a 
3D image appeared to emerge. Participants were asked to press a button, indicating that the 
image had fully appeared. EEG data was collected and participants gave a short verbal report of 
experience immediately after pushing the button. Participants reported their experiences by using 
categories and terms that they had developed during a prior training session. The training gave 
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participants the opportunity to become acclimated to the visual discrimination expectations of the 
task and accustomed to the exploration of their experiences. The researchers employed a refined  
methodological trinity, training participants to engage in three phases of awareness: suspension, 
redirection, and receptive openness (Thompson et al., 2005). These techniques helped 
participants recognize the lived quality of experience and resist judgment or self-analyzing. 
During the study, participants self-generated the reports or were assisted with open questions 
from interviewers (Petitmengin-Peugeot C., 1999). These reports created clusters of experience: 
steady readiness, fragmented readiness, and unreadiness (Lutz et al., 2002). The researchers 
considered these categories invariants and they divided individual trials into these 
phenomenological clusters for analysis. The resulting heuristic not only accommodated 
interpretations of the neural activity, but also actually helped detect activity. Consequently, 
neural signatures (detected via phase-synchrony and amplitude) could correlate more closely 
with actual experiences. Not only could the researchers find commonalities in neural behaviors 
across participant experiences of readiness, but they also found high degrees of variation 
between subjects. The variation would have been considered “noise” under classic neuroscience 
methods. The behaviors were demonstrated consistently within individuals for multiple days and 
multiple recording sessions, so with the neurophenomenological technique, the researchers could 
confidently retain the data and make strong claims of significance in the results. In the end, the 
neurophenomenological study indicated stable neural phase-synchrony during perception and 
that neural and behavioral responses correlated with first person experiential accounts. 
NP has established itself as a method useful for studying experience, but, like psychology 
and neuroscience, it has challenges. These may be considered in terms of the sources: internal to 
NP and external. A challenge internal to NP is its history of dependence upon trained subjects. 
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Some participants are trained within the context of the study itself, as in the one described above. 
Other studies have relied upon mindfulness training of various types, such as using Tibetan 
monks with 10,000 to 50,000 hours of meditation experience (Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, Ricard, 
& Davidson, 2004). In other instances, NP studies have trained the participants to direct their 
mental attention over the course of a longer experimental design (see Lutz et al., 2002). 
However, dependence on trained subjects raises epistemological and methodological issues. I 
assert that these issues are not insurmountable, and I address this internal challenge by a strategic 
phenomenological interview in the present study. 
The external challenges are rooted in interdisciplinary tension, the institutional values and 
creeds, spoken or unspoken, that cling to each discipline. For example, some cognitive 
psychologists might not be comfortable with generalizing claims from studies with extremely 
low participant numbers (the visual perception study described above only had four participants). 
Neuroscience may not share this problem, strictly, as the experimental employment of case 
studies (particularly lesion studies) has been essential for the advancement of the field. Instead, 
some neuroscientists may take umbrage with NP’s application of first-person data. This position 
emphasizes neutrality and insists that a first-person science be executed in a manner that collects 
data in the second-person and handles that data in the soundly objective third-person (Dennett, 
2003). The interdisciplinary tensions raise challenges of varied sorts, but all have to do with the 
problems inherent in merging the traditions, methods, and tools from various academic histories. 
The present study takes effort to address the challenges internal and external to NP 
systematically. It applies methodological lessons learned as outlined by Bockelman, Reinerman-
Jones, & Gallagher (2013) to establish and maintain a shared mental model among researchers, 
retain experimental validity, and refine the procedures for the phenomenological interview. It is 
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not necessary to determine the degree to which any prior neurophenomenological study did these 
things. The assertion is simply: untrained participants can yield generalizable and valid results 
when the interdisciplinary team designs the experiment with attention to the needs and 
expectations of the contributing disciplines. The present study uses such an approach to advance 
the understanding of astronaut experience.  
Justification for the Study 
Finding a method for examining the neural correlates of human experience is one small 
part of a larger quest to explore the brain and its activities. In the 2013 State of the Union 
address, the President stated the importance of neuroscience research (Obama, 2013). Within two 
months, he expanded on that comment, revealing more formalized support for efforts in brain 
mapping (Jacobson, 2013). These efforts have enabled the identification of neural correlates for 
some aspects of human behavior, but little advancement has been made about the more nuanced 
aspects of cognition and consciousness.  
The study of experiences, including spiritual and aesthetic ones, have implications for 
countless aspects of social and individual welfare. For instance, spiritual and aesthetic 
experiences are linked to religious constructs. Spirituality and religion are not only important to 
individuals, their intimate and personal experiences, but they shape society as well. Spirituality 
and religion influence economic choices (Marshall, 2004), politics (Guétin, 2009), parenting 
(Lees & Horwath, 2009), and healthcare (Kline, 2011; Ruijs et al., 2012). To date, science has 
just begun to untangle these ties between personal experiences, feelings, beliefs, and behaviors. 
Researchers will benefit from refined methods that address the dynamic puzzle of experience.    
Researchers will have a better understanding of what spiritual and aesthetic experiences 
are after the establishment of methods that successfully apply to the examination of those 
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phenomena. Scientists must investigate connections between mind, brain, body, and environment 
using approaches with enough flexibility to accommodate unique experiences while maintaining 
the reliability of established means of empirical prediction. It is not useful to insist upon 
constricted research methods that push experience into a solely objective mold or rely 
exclusively upon externally imposed parameters (e.g. surveys, questionnaires).  
NP methods incorporate objective and subjective data in ways that retain statistical power 
of established disciplines (like cognitive science) while embracing the inherent value of first-
person reports of experience. The approach proposed herein seeks to clarify specific methods for 
basic NP research and test these methods within an experiment. These methods are emphasized 
for the type of basic research that can be conducted across cultures and replicated by 
interdisciplinary teams. This does not suppose that all NP must follow this example, but that 
future NP studies may be guided toward a more cohesive project in understanding experience if 
researchers endeavor to engage in complementary lines of work. The potential rewards from the 
experimental and methodological findings justify the investigation in the proposed manner.    
The findings of this study can also apply to multiple private and public industry 
endeavors. The results support the preparation and care of persons engaged in commercial and 
long-term space missions. By examining past astronaut experience and analogous simulation 
based experiences, programs to prepare and care for space travelers can be better developed and 
implemented. Additionally, findings regarding the nature and structure of experience generally 
can be used to advance therapeutic interventions for trauma-induced disorders. The elicitation of 
AWCH has instrumental value for the entertainment industry, particularly as it is used in theme 
parks and digital media, as those are experiences for which audiences would pay. One of the 
more optimistic justifications of the study is the hope that understanding experiences, 
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particularly those of religious and spiritual nature, will help develop strategies for addressing 
conflicts and human rights concerns with roots in spiritual and religious experience.  
The breadth and depth of reasons to pursuit this study are expansive, so it was with these 
justifications in mind that objectives for a research plan were created.  
Research Objectives 
To examine the efficacy of specific NP methods, the present study: 
1. Applied the methodological lessons derived from a baseline experiment to an 
experiment using a simulation environment to elicit spiritual and aesthetic 
experiences. 
2. Compared the findings from the present experiment to the baseline discussed in the 
literature review. 
The first objective included an assessment of the design and execution of the baseline 
experiment. The result was a compilation and assertion of methodological lessons learned. The 
second objective required experimentation to examine the efficacy of the suggested 
methodological improvements. In the Viewing Earth from Space: First-person Experiences 
experiment a simulated view of Earth was presented to participants from two contextual 
vantages, focal (FOC) and global (GLO). Participant experiences were measured using 
neurophysiological sensors, psychological metrics, and a phenomenological interview. The 
concept model for the study (Figure 1) illustrates the workflow that supported progress toward 





Figure 1. Concept model of study 
 The interdisciplinary field of Modeling and Simulation (MS) contributed to the present 
study in a way that, while not required for every neurophenomenological study, certainly shaped 
this research. In the present study, MS theories were applied to the simulation test bed design, 
concept mapping for collaboration and coordination between team members, data fitting, and 
cognitive models. To accomplish the objectives, the experiment employed specific manipulations 
(i.e. context), simulation test bed selection, and phenomenological interviews used to establish 
phenomenological clusters for analysis. Further, to accomplish the research plan, a common 
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Definitions of Key Terms 
NP comes from the merger of domains and requires ongoing interdisciplinarity to 
function. To collaborate and coordinate with other researchers, contributors must acknowledge 
that the use of a shared lexicon may require some adaptation as terms may be used differently by 
various disciplines. Therefore, the following definitions are operationalized to position the 
concepts as they are used within this study, not to assert that the definitions offered have been 
conclusively determined. The following definitions represent the descriptions needed to examine 
NP methods in this research.  
 
Aesthetic: Pertaining to the sense of affective appreciation of the perceived, both internal to and 
external to the body (Reinerman-Jones et al., In press). 
Awe: A direct and initial feeling when faced with something incomprehensible or sublime 
(Reinerman-Jones et al., In press). 
Context: The circumstances or aspects of a specific event in time (Dey, 2001). 
Curiosity: Wanting to know, see, experience, and/or understand more (Reinerman-Jones et al., 
In press). 
First-person Data: Information generated by an experimental participant or subject that may 
include qualitative and narrative components (Posner, 1989). 
Humility: A sense one has about one’s relation to the universe (an issue of scale) or one’s 
significance (an issue of moral aspect) (Reinerman-Jones et al., In press). 




Mental Awareness: The techniques and tools associated with the capacity for individuals to 
attend to their states, while suspending judgment or self-analysis (Petitmengin, 2006, 2010). 
Methods: The practices and techniques for conducting experimentation, including design, 
execution, and analysis (Boden, 2006). 
Mixed-reality: A subset of virtual reality environments that blends synthetic features with real-
world features so that users may interact with real-world objects within the context of the 
simulation (Sherman & Craig, 2002). 
Neurophenomenology: A study of mind, experience, and consciousness that incorporates tools 
and techniques from neuroscience and psychology with phenomenologically derived first-person 
data (Varela, 1996). 
Objective Data: Information that may be collected by observation (Posner, 1989). 
Phenomenology: The study of experience; seeks to describe and categorize what it is like from a 
first-person perspective (Gallagher, 2007). 
Religious: Pertaining to the spiritual practices in rites and belief systems that may or may not be 
organized in collection with other like-minded practitioners (Reinerman-Jones et al., In press). 
Simulation Test Bed: A virtual environment used for experimentation (Reinerman-Jones et al., 
In press). 
Spiritual: Pertaining to the aspects of life at the essence of human experience; transformation 
motivated by experience. 
Subjective Data: Information reported by participants (Posner, 1989). 
Virtual Reality: Realistically presented computer-generated simulation environment (Sherman 
& Craig, 2002). 
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Wonder: A reflective feeling one has when unable to put things back into a familiar conceptual 
framework (Reinerman-Jones et al., In press).  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
From Phenomenon to Neurophenomenology 
As its name implies, NP blends data collection methods from neuroscience and 
phenomenology. In the 20
th
century, Husserl established phenomenology, a project to explore 
experience and phenomenality
1
 (Husserl, 1970). The great mission of phenomenology continues 
to be centered on subjective experience, though the proposed means to that end vary. While it is 
beyond the scope of the present study to trace the various applications and interpretations of the 
phenomenological project, it is essential that it be made clear how this study draws from the 
phenomenological tradition. To do that, the following section will explore key ideas from the 
phenomenological traditions that most directly apply to the present study. 
 Broadly, phenomenology asserts that an experience can be understood, at least in part, 
by considering what that experience is like. There is something it is like to experience 
phenomena. This emphasizes the nature and structure of experience, as a legitimate object of 
scientific inquiry, with an ambition to develop models of human experience. Though 
phenomenology’s roots were distinctly philosophical, its rigorous methods of categorization and 
analysis have led to its incorporation in the cognitive sciences. At its best, phenomenology has 
shaped experimental design, and experimental results have, in turn, shaped the 
phenomenological project. This symbiotic relationship between science and phenomenology is 
                                                 
1
 Phenomenality and intentionality are two categories in the broader discussion of consciousness and 
arguably pertinent to phenomenology. For the purpose of the present discussion, it is important to establish that 
aspect of consciousness studies centered on describing “what it is like” has traditionally been characterized as 
phenomenality. However, one should not assume that these are rigidly drawn categories, and the phenomenological 
project holds promise for further clarifying the relationships between these (and potentially other) aspects of 
experience  (Zahavi, 2003). The point at hand is that these descriptive distinctions are one portion of the larger 
problem of describing the nature and structure of experience. 
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most clearly evident in neurophenomenological research. The father of NP, Francisco Varela 
(1996) built on the phenomenological writings of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty to 
shape a project of experimental philosophy in cognitive neuroscience. The objective for 
experimental NP was, and continues to be, the bridging of first-person experiential data and 
neurophysiological data (Varela, 1996). NP’s naturalized phenomenology (Schmicking, 2010; 
Gallagher, 2003) inverts the notion that empirically derived results always drive philosophical 
interpretation. Instead, a naturalized phenomenology uses philosophically-derived relationships 
between concepts to structure the experiment before data is collected; the philosophy drives the 
experiment. Careful pre-experimental phenomenological analyses shape experimental design, by 
front-loading the phenomenology into the experimental design (Gallagher, 2003) or constructing 
heuristics to assist classifications of experimental findings. The result, according to proponents 
of the approach, is an experimental design that can correlate experience and brain behaviors. 
More importantly, the relationship between body, mind, and world can be mapped in a manner 
that allows the experience to be the unit of study, rather than only the experiencer. 
NP has emerged as an alternative approach to studying experience, filling gaps left by 
other approaches, including neurophysiology and cognitive psychology. Classic 
neurophysiological studies typically seek correlation between performance on cognitive tasks 
and brain responses. Cognitive science, with research roots in psychology, treats the study of 
experience with the same objectivity appropriate within that field for any other aspect of 
cognitive behavior. That is, even when subjective data is collected, cognitive science methods 
require that the evidence be transformed and managed in classical statistical ways. The crux of 
this muddle is the manipulation of hard-to-handle information. For example, data would be 
collected in the form of scales and surveys, so that it may be quantified. In the rare cognitive 
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science study, participants may be interviewed, but every participant would be exposed to 
identical questions. These are legitimate practices, well established in the field, and important 
contributors to our understanding of a great deal of psychology (Boden, 2006; Posner, 1989). 
However, they fall short of synthesizing data to develop any framework for experience.  
Gallagher (2003) draws from the work of other neurophenomenologists (e.g. Lutz & 
Varela) to discuss the synthesis of data into subjective parameters (SP), claiming that they vary 
to such extents that researchers too often dismiss them. NP asserts that SP, which may be 
dismissed under the traditional neurophysiological model (Gallagher, 2003), can merge the 
benefits of both third-person quantitative data and first-person qualitative data in a manner that 
accommodates substantiated neural correlation and variability between subjects. Gallagher’s 
subsequent NP methodology shapes experimentation with the goal for collecting both subjective 
and objective data and handling that information appropriately according to those distinctions.  
First-person data inevitably poses problems for traditional empirical approaches and these 
problems are made manifest in two categories of philosophical challenge. One category of 
challenge is an extension of reductionism, which is the proposition that all conscious experiences 
can be reduced to purely physiological explanation (Churchland, 2002)
 2
. The other challenge is 
a matter of sufficiency, which questions the capability of NP to deliver on its promises to reveal 
anything that traditional scientific methods cannot capture (Bayne, 2004). The concerns deserve 
greater attention and examination than the scope of the present paper justifies devoting, but while 
it is beyond this work to delve into that philosophical debate, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
both of those challenges matter as far as they challenge the merit of the present methodology.  
                                                 
2
 For an introduction to the philosophical debate on reductionist interpretations of neuroscience, see 
(Bechtel, Stufflebeam, Mundale, & Mandik, 2001). 
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Gallagher (2007) addressed the reductionist challenge in neurophilosophy, by arguing 
that science strives “to explain what there is” (p. 311, author’s emphasis). Consequently, the 
category of what there is must not omit those things that may not be reducible to neuronal 
processes or easily quantifiable. Researchers ought not to confine personal processes and unique 
experiences to the objectifying rigidities of scientific methods; rather science can expand its 
methods to include the phenomenological practices that capture, investigate, and explain the 
irreducible. Precisely by refusing to objectify the entirety of personal experience, 
phenomenology can allow science to encompass a broader field for methodological examination. 
By this reasoning, the reductionist challenge rejects the inclusive potential of phenomenological 
experimentation and by doing so falls short of capturing the qualitative and unique aspects of 
human experience. It is from this vantage that Gallagher outlines a methodology that makes 
space for multiple sources of data. NP values both biological description and first-person 
account, thereby addressing the first challenge, the reductive claim.  
Philosophers of science and neuroscience researchers also have considered the second 
challenge, regarding the efficacy of NP to deliver meaningful results. This challenge hinges on a 
conflation of the varied approaches to phenomenological application. Bayne (2004) criticized NP 
for failing to close the explanatory gap and offering no distinct approach for doing so. This 
ignores the extensive variation in approaches laid out by philosophers and scientists who cover a 
spectrum of views on the role and methods of first-person accounts. In Bayne’s view, the fact 
that there are gaps in our understanding of consciousness indicates that there must be no way for 
NP to fill those gaps (p. 361). The logical fallacy of that argument aside, the challenge raised 
resides in the same arena in which the rebuttal belongs: there is no one NP method. 
Consequently, there is merit to the argument that it, thus far, has insufficiently captured the 
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phenomena under scrutiny. The contention of dispute is the claim that it cannot capture these 
experiential aspects of mind. To deal with this challenge, a closer look at the explanatory gap 
must be taken. 
The techniques employed in phenomenological and introspective research are broad and 
adopt different components of neuroscience and psychology (cf.  Dennett, 2003; Fingelkurts, 
Fingelkurts, Bagnato, Boccagni, & Galardi, 2012a; Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, & Varela, 2002; 
Varela, 1996). As NP matures, the methods for integrated phenomenology undergo refinement to 
continue closing a variety of explanatory gaps in neuroscience. Thompson, Lutz, & Cosmelli 
(2005) described the explanatory gaps to be addressed by NP as follows: 
1. The conceptual gap involves the problem of first-person experience, the ability to 
report, and the manifestation of neurobiological responses. 
2. The epistemological gap includes issues of meta-awareness, or the potentially 
deforming effects of attending to experience and re-experiencing something in 
memory. 
3. The methodological gap involves the means by which first-person data is generated, 
handled, and analyzed. 
The present work focuses on the methodological gap, but it would be erroneous to 
assume that any of these aspects of the explanatory gap work in isolation, for they depend on one 
another. The proposed research addresses the methodological gaps in NP, while simultaneously 
contributing to the body of knowledge regarding human experience. 
There is reason to suggest efficacy of NP methods, although they remain broadly defined. 
For example, studies using phenomenological techniques in the evaluation and treatment of 
epilepsy and other neurophysical conditions indicate validity for the broader category of NP 
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approaches (Fingelkurts et al., 2012; Petitmengin, 2010). However, there is a difference between 
applied settings and basic research, and it would behoove the NP project at large to find ways of 
being conducted in various settings using similar approaches. If some of the methodological gaps 
are addressed, NP could deliver first-person data and handle that data in an unprecedented 
manner, providing clarifications and classifications that are not captured by classical cognitive 
science approaches. A paradigmatic shift in the scientific approach to the study of mind, like the 
shift proposed in NP, could support breakthroughs in numerous domains involving human 
cognition. Of course, paradigmatic shifts are never met without resistance. 
Neurophenomenology or Cognitive Science? 
Some neurophilosophers challenge the assumptions of NP outright, dismissing its value 
to science, let alone its potential to transform the study of human cognition. One of the most 
vocal oppositions to NP has come from Daniel Dennett. He asserted that philosophy and biology 
act in tandem to illuminate aspects of consciousness. In his assertion he denied the assumption 
that NP contributes anything beyond the techniques and tools of cognitive science
3
 (Dennett, 
2007; Dennett, 2003; Dennett, 2001). He applied the moniker heterophenomenology to describe 
a type of cognitive science that incorporates various aspects of mind and body to study 
experience. Dennett had selected the prefix “hetero-” to evoke the inclusive nature of his stance 
(Dennett, 2003) and separate it from competing phenomenological approaches, such as those 
asserted within NP. This distinction drew a line between data collected from self-reports and that 
                                                 
3
 Tracing the methodological roots of cognitive science is not the focus of this literature review, as the aim 
herein is to position the present study in light of pertinent historical and contemporary work. Thus the following 
definition of cognitive science will suffice: it merges multiple disciplines, with heavy dependence on the data 
handling techniques of experimental psychology; it strives for objectivity in the handling of participants; it relies 
heavily upon the quantification of qualitative data (Boden, 2006). 
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which was collected based on the reports of others. He did not go so far as to claim he was 
offering anything revolutionary, merely an alternative way for discussing already existing 
approaches (Dennett, 2003).   
Dennett’s description of heterophenomenology drew support and criticism. Some claimed 
he was simply re-stating Husserl’s original ideas and others said that he contradicted Husserl in 
every way (c.f. Dennett, 2007). Possible heresy against the traditions of phenomenology aside, 
Dennett was issuing a challenge for NP to demonstrate the accomplishment of anything beyond 
what cognitive science could deliver. Heterophenomenology was positioned in opposition to NP. 
Dennett emphasized neutrality and insisted that a first-person science be executed in a manner 
that collects data in the second-person and handles the data in the soundly objective third-person. 
From that vantage, much of the research conducted in NP would be absorbed into Dennett’s 
heterophenomenological framework and subsumed under the broader category of cognitive 
science, or it would be dismissed outright as not offering anything of empirical value (Figure 2). 
Cognitive science already quantifies subjective experience, while retaining data-collection 
objectivity (Posner, 1989). The heterophenomenological argument continues to depend on 





Figure 2. Nested description of heterophenomenology’s place in the study of mind. 
 
To capture the essence of the argument: some researchers assert that phenomenological 
approaches to studying cognitive topics are essentially cognitive science under a different name: 
the only differences are superficial packaging (Dennett, 2007; Dennett, 2003; Roy, 2007; 
Siewert, 2007). Others argue that the differences are far from superficial and that these 
distinctions can move neuroscience into a new realm for investigation by opening novel theories 
and methods (Gallagher, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2010; Thompson et al., 2005; Zahavi, 2007). 
 Proponents of NP reject the assumption that objective data is necessarily superior to 
subjective data. They also seek to avoid the transmogrifications that can result when first-person 
data is forced into a third-person structure. NP proponents argue that the explanatory gap can 
close if subjective data is handled properly. They argue that NP is not just a sub-set of cognitive 
science approaches, in part because the approach requires individuals to be addressed differently 
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from one to the next. For example, large-scale brain processes often vary from trial to trial and 
across participants. To add to the complexity of the problem, variability of this sort has often 
been inadequately controlled within experimentation (Thompson et al., 2005). To face the 
challenges inherent to large-scale complexity, Varela (1999) hypothesized that an embodied and 
situated agent’s nervous system generates a transient and coherent large-scale assembly and the 
resulting mental-cognitive state is a neural interpretation of that activity. With this 
understanding, NP works to test that core hypothesis by applying phenomenological 
investigations to neurodynamisms. To do so, NP relies on first-person methods to obtain 
descriptions of lived experience that could not be attained otherwise. 
Varela and Shear (1999) suggested that prior research in cognitive science had been 
limited in part by dependence on a flawed definition of objectivity that limited the investigation 
of first-person data. At that point in cognitive science’s history, most researchers considered the 
outside world relatively separate from the mental content of the human subject. Varela and Shear 
(1999) rejected that limited view of mind and encouraged neuroscientists to include subjective 
experience in an enactive world as an “explicit and active component” (p. 2) in consciousness. 
They proposed a system of dynamic reciprocal constraints (DRC; Varela, 1996, 1999) to 
illustrate this interplay of multi-source data. In the DRC model, constraints on data come, not 
from an externalized assumption of objectivity, but from a co-regulated interaction of first-
person experiential reports and analyses of neurophysiological data (Figure 3). DRC further 
separated NP from other approaches to handling first-person data by establishing a model that 




Figure 3. Illustration of DRC 
Handling First-Person Data 
One concern with the approach of cognitive psychology is the risk of conflating 
subjective and introspective experiences. The NP stance, in opposition to alternative approaches 
of cognitive science, led to an important distinction: the content of a mental state ought not to be 
conflated with the process through which the content appears (Varela & Shear, 1999). The 
content/process distinction set the precedence for training participants in becoming aware of 
those mental nuances. For NP to work, it was not enough for participants to recount what they 
experienced (e.g. What color did you see? What was the scent?). The goal, in true 
phenomenological tradition, was to capture the lived experience (e.g. How is it to see that color? 
What is that scent like?). Varela and Shear (1999) pointed out that certain Eastern practices 
(namely, Vedic transcendental meditation, Dzogchen and Zen Buddhism, and some practices in 
Vajrayana Buddhism) diminish the role of content in conscious presence. Years of mindfulness 
practice helps practitioners distinguish between content and process, and consequently provide 
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experience is often difficult and confounded, participants in NP experimentation must be trained 
in mental awareness methods. From that assertion regarding the distinction between content and 
process, a broad assumption arose across NP research that working with mindfulness-trained 
participants was required. 
Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, & Varela (2002) explored the relationship between 
neurological data from electroencephalograph (EEG) signals and first-person accounts from 
participants trained to recognize their cognitive content and processes. They focused on neural 
patterns associated with attention, vigilance, and expectation and assumed that cognitive contexts 
provided by the participants would correlate with neural behaviors. They hypothesized that 
specific neural patterns would condition the response to the stimulus. Trained participants 
engaged in a visual identification task that involved watching a random-dot image change until a 
three-dimensional shape appears. Participants were trained by participating in the task and 
answering open-ended questions to help the participants become aware of their experience just 
prior to the shape coming into view. The results of the training interviews provided 
phenomenological clusters (PhCs). Neurological data was collected on 200 to 350 trials from 
each person. Three PhCs were described a posteriori based on the aforementioned training. The 
PhCs of unreadiness, fragmented readiness, and steady readiness were used to interpret the 
neurodynamic measurements during the perception of the three-dimensional illusion. The 
authors argued that the study had broader implications for understanding consciousness. In 
particular, they argued that it would be important to re-examine assumptions regarding temporal 
intervals in neural correlates of conscious behavior because a moment of consciousness always 
extends from a previous one and therefore cannot be considered neutral. In that light, a brain’s 
response to stimuli and the corresponding lived experience must extend temporally into previous 
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experiences (Lutz et al., 2002; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008). Their findings 
supported the NP approach and provided an exemplar for the use of trained participants. 
Since its earlier days, NP research has expanded to include efforts for handling untrained-
participant data. Petitmengin (2006) argued that there may be ways to help an untrained 
participant accurately articulate subjective experience. The solution was a specific interview 
method. Petitmengin acknowledged that it is wrong to assume that being aware of an experience 
would, necessarily, improve the articulation of the experience. She suggested phenomenological 
interview techniques could help untrained participants attend to and articulate their experience. 
Testing the assertion, nine epileptic patients were interviewed over the course of eighteen 
months. All of the participants experienced pharma-resistant temporal lobe focal seizure 
epilepsy. The interviews were used to generate phenomenological clusters of preictal state 
experiences, which were subsequently used to interpret EEG readings in a novel manner. The 
results suggested that preictal experiences are manifest in epileptic patients much earlier than 
neuroscientists had expected (Petitmengin, 2006). While a questionnaire might have provided 
quantitative data that could generalize something about preictal experiences, the purpose for the 
phenomenological interview was to go much deeper. The interviews sought a smaller number of 
experiences in higher degrees of unique detail. Using phenomenological interviews in these 
contexts, Petitmengin collected data that fed into the DRC paradigm and yielded results that 
contributed to both the theoretical science of epilepsy and the therapeutic expertise of patients 
involved in the research program. 
The co-regulation of constraints, as captured in the DRC model, combined with the 
application of the phenomenological interview, establish the foundation for NP methods. 
However, in order to carry out basic research and put the theories into laboratory practice, the NP 
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methods must be executed across interdisciplinary teams. For example, the present study 
incorporates the phenomenological interview and neurophysiology using a technique borrowed 
from psychology: measuring individual differences. The tradition of differential psychology may 
trace itself most famously to the unfortunate efforts of phrenology, but as the study of individual 
differences has advanced, so have its methods (Zola-Morgan, 1995). The overarching goal in 
studying individual differences is to identify traits, characteristics, and behaviors that may be 
normal for that individual, but get lost in the tendencies to find generalizations in psychological 
research. This approach merges ideally with NP. Indeed, there is precedence for the application 
of individual differences to study complex topics. Individual differences have been extensively 
useful in advancing understanding in a number of psychological and cognitive constructs, 
including personality (Kluckhohn, Murray, & Schneider, 1953), intelligence (Sternberg, 2000), 
and developmental cognition (Demetriou, Raftopoulos, & Kargopoulos, 1999). In the study of 
experience, individual differences have been used to examine valence and arousal (Feldman, 
1995) and emotional processes (Gohm & Clore, 2000; McCullough, Tsang, & Emmons, 2004).  
The present study is positioned in the neurophenomenological tradition, leveraging the 
tools of neuroscience, phenomenology, and psychology. Therefore, while there is precedence for 
these tools and approaches, the present work aims to establish a refined methodology that can 
increase replicability and optimize untrained participants so that researchers can delve into the 
nature and structure of experience. 
Toward Experience 
Most research in measuring experience has been relegated to customer or user 
satisfaction. These metrics observe the user or the customer more than the nature and structure of 
the experience itself. They are motivated by a drive to use the information to change something 
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(e.g. a marketing plan or a device’s ergonomics), rather than collecting data about experience as 
a subject of study unto itself. Consequently, there is little work on the subject of “experience” 
that satisfactorily distinguishes the experience from the experiencer. The goal in this distinction 
is not to claim anything about an actual separation between the experience and the experiencer, 
but to direct the focus on the correct unit of study. 
To apply NP in the present work, in any useful sense, the broad umbrella of “experience” 
needed to be narrowed. The present study addressed spiritual, aesthetic, and religious 
experiences specifically by examining the associated constructs of AWCH. This is not an 
assertion that AWCH has any sort of primacy, neither in a phenomenological sense nor in an 
applied sense when one considers spiritual and aesthetic experience. However, the study started 
from the accounts of spiritual experiences, and AWCH were identified as central components to 
those experiences. From a methodological position, focusing on specific experiences helps center 
the present work on the efficacy of the neurophenomenological toolbox in studying human 
experiences while also addressing constructs pertinent to multiple fields.  
Some researchers have delved into spiritual and aesthetic research, but it is typically an 
objective attempt to make psychoreligious and psychospiritual diagnoses (Hackney & Sanders, 
2003; Lukoff, Lu, & Turner, 1992; Murray, Cunningham, & Price, 2012). These applied contexts 
can and have been integrated into long-term healthcare and hospice (Holland et al., 1998; Idler et 
al., 2003). The problem still, however, is that the experiencer is the object of study, not the 
experience. Non-diagnostic research has also been conducted, but it too has missed the mark of 
studying the experience, as it ultimately has emphasized religious behaviors, particularly the 
practice of one’s belief system (Johnstone, Yoon, Franklin, Schopp, & Hinkebein, 2008; King & 
Hunt, 1969).  
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The present work abandoned the historical pattern of focus on the experiencer and 
examined spiritual and aesthetic experiences through multiple disciplinary lenses. Consequently, 
the approach used herein presented practical challenges to the already theoretical difficulties 
inherent to the topic of experience. To delve into the interdisciplinary challenges inherent to NP 
examinations of spiritual and aesthetic experiences, it was essential to narrow the focus and 
establish a shared nomenclature.  
First, the spiritual and aesthetic experiences were narrowed to further focus on AWCH. 
The preliminary and ongoing hermeneutic contributions from Gallagher and Janz (see Appendix 
D) provided scores of subcategories, constructs, and relationships between relevant experiential 
topics. To scope the present work, a handful of these received focus, while the data collected 
remains useful for further analysis of the other constructs as well. As mentioned in Chapter One, 
AWCH were the categories emphasized in the present study. They were selected primarily 
because AWCH recur in the experiential accounts collected from astronaut and cosmonaut 
journals and interviews. The astronauts’ narratives carry a unique power for many reasons. First, 
their demographics consist largely of scientists. These women and men return from the 
experience of spaceflight changed, and their reports indicate that these changes are often spiritual 
in nature. They report being moved affectively in a manner that they describe as eliciting an 
internal change. The astronauts are empiricists, who return to earth with a sense of something 
bigger “out there.” Second, they experience something that few other humans experience, space. 
This matters greatly if research is to be conducted using participants from western universities. 
There are numerous experiences that could elicit AWCH (e.g. witnessing birth, seeing natural 
spectacles like the Grand Canyon or Victoria Falls, or walking through icons of human ingenuity 
such as the Great Wall or the Coliseum). However, researchers could construct a study involving 
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space, and guarantee that not a single participant had actually ever visited. Consequently, if the 
simulation induces AWCH, it is not likely affected by a prior experience in space
4
. 
In the past decade, scientists have promoted the cultivation of awe as a beneficial 
characteristic for clinical psychology (Schneider, 2005) and other areas of patient care (Evans, 
2012). These advocates would propose that an awe-filled approach to interaction with their fields 
supports superior work for both their disciplines and the individuals under care. This perspective 
comes out of a larger movement that embraces an interdisciplinary approach to studying 
religious and spiritual experience more broadly (Taves, 2010). The larger project, as Taves 
would frame it, attempts to apply scientific methods to aspects of religious texts, find common 
ground in reductionism and extended mind, and explain human animals’ senses of spirituality. 
This approach is distinct from previous ones aimed at naturalizing human spirituality (Dewey, 
1991; Maslow, 1994) as it opts for something of an inversion. A naturalized approach would 
consider every aspect of a phenomenon under an objective lens, whereas the interdisciplinary 
approach works to incorporate the potential value of subjective data in the discussions of 
spiritual and aesthetic phenomena. One ambitious end of such an approach would be to elucidate 
the relationships between affect, reason, and experience and present those findings in an 
empirical manner (as opposed to leaving such inquiries to philosophers and theologians). 
Ultimately, interdisciplinary research, such as that conducted through NP, helps mend disparate 
fragments of the dynamic complexity that links the human mind and human behaviors in tasks of 
all sorts. 
                                                 
4
 This by no means implies absolute equity in prior experiences. There is no assumption that the 
participants in this study are completely unfamiliar with space travel as presented through other media. To account 
for these other, less controllable experiences, demographic data included questions to find out about practices such 
as: attending IMAX presentations, visiting theme parks (particularly relevant was the Kennedy Space Center), and 
computer interaction.  
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For example, in the research examined herein, awe and wonder provide construct 
exemplars. Awe, as a component of spiritual and religious experience, comes from historic 
philosophical traditions. In the 18
th
 century, Edmund Burke’s philosophical treatises struggled 
with the sublime and beautiful, binding these constructs conceptually with awe-filled emotions. 
These emotions do not imply pleasure, in its most obvious sense, but Burke asserts that people 
experience awe inseparably from terror, power, obscurity, and humility (Burke, 2010). Gallagher 
et al. (In Review) define awe as a direct and initial feeling when faced with something 
incomprehensible or sublime. In contrast to the directness of awe, wonder demands cognitive 
reflection. Fuller (2009) argued that wonder serves humanity by bridging emotion with the desire 
to apply order to the universe. It is much like the sentiment of Albert Magnus, who a millennium 
ago stated, “… wonder is the movement of the man who does not know on his way to finding 
out” (Greenblatt, 1990). Distinct from pure emotion, it elicits the verb, “wondering” (Parsons, 
1969). The present research defines wonder as a more reflective feeling one has when unable to 
put things back into a familiar conceptual framework. Curiosity also regards a desire to piece 
things together, but in a different way. According to Gallagher et al. (In Review), curiosity 
involves wanting to know, see, experience, and/or understand more. The object of this wanting 
may be technical, logical, moral, or existential. In 1914, John Milton McIndoo asserted that 
curiosity opposes the impulse to flee in fear. That which may incite fear at first may become 
intriguing, as familiarity grows (McIndoo, 1914). In this respect, it acts as an important contrast 
to humility, which also may involve fear. Philosophers and theoreticians vary greatly concerning 
humility, attaching it to everything from psychological concerns of self-esteem, roles within 
cultures, and the limits of knowledge within the universe (Tangney, 2000). Regardless, humility 
demands a sense of perspective, where one must place oneself in scale to someone or something 
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else. In the present study, humility is a sense one has about one’s relation to the universe (an 
issue of scale) or one’s significance (an issue of moral aspect). With these working definitions of 
AWCH, researchers applying an interdisciplinary NP approach can examine experiential 
phenomena and offer possible interpretations of the findings. 
Clarifying Methods with “Lessons Learned” 
The preceding sections of this chapter have outlined the philosophical and theoretical 
position of NP, positioning it as both complementary to some, but divergent from other aspects 
of cognitive science. Further, a case has been made for NP as an inherently interdisciplinary way 
to explore complex spiritual and aesthetic experiences. With these contributions from academic 
research in mind, the following section presents a review of a baseline NP study and identifies 
areas for methodological refinement. 
The baseline study, Space, Science, and Spirituality was a collaborative interdisciplinary 
endeavor (Reinerman-Jones et al., In press). Researchers from multiple disciplines divided 
portions of work to create an immersive experience of space travel for the purpose of gathering 
neurophysiological and phenomenological data. Astronauts had captured their experiences of 
space travel in written journals containing details of both visual and affective experiences. 
Linguistic and semantic analyses were used to identify and categorize the ways astronauts 
verbally expressed their experiences in writing. These details informed the design of a mixed-
reality immersive test environment where participants viewed images of space and provided a 
narrative comparison for first-person experiential accounts. In the baseline experiment 
(Gallagher, et al., In Review), collaborators from the Kolleg-Forschergruppe Bildakt und 
Verkörperung (College for Advanced Study of Image-act and Embodiment) used the NASA 
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Image Database to identify criteria for the simulation design. The analyses revealed necessary 
characteristics of the visual experiences from a space vantage: 
• Few or no artifacts from optical refraction or lens effects 
• No aged or chemical effects from film 
• No visible manipulations in terms of coloring (as those found in digital editing) 
• No marking and inscriptions (such as watermarks) 
• Pictures should be focused and/or rich in detail 
• Views should be possible from a spacecraft within the terra-lunar system and  
  could be made by human observers 
Artists used these criteria, along with two standards for manipulation: An earth view 
should show the earth as a visible crescent, not as an iconic blue marble and a space view should 
have no identifiable objects other than a high star count due to atmospheric absence resulting in 
clarified vision (Reinerman-Jones et al., In press). With these conditions in mind, the artists 
designed a set for a mixed-reality simulation wherein participants were immersed in the sounds 
and sights of something like a science fiction movie set. Simulation artists integrated the Bildakt 
group’s analyses in both the baseline (Reinerman-Jones, et al., 2013) and the present study. 
Both the baseline study and the present experiment use simulation technologies to 
generate controlled conditions. Varying degrees of realistic experiences are possible within 
virtual reality simulators and they can allow for NP research to be conducted with high levels of 
control. Designers must address immersion, point-of-view, and venue concerns to establish an 
effective simulation experience (Sherman & Craig, 2002). Additionally, considerations of quality 
and presence should be integrated into the simulation environment (Gaggioli, Bassi, & Fave, 
2003). That is, the simulation should support a willing suspension of disbelief and in doing so, 
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allow for a narrative transfer that takes the participant into the world presented within the 
simulation. The suggestions from the Bildakt group reflect an intention to increase immersion, 
clarify point-of-view, and be applicable within the limitations of the mixed-reality simulation 
environment used in the experiment.  
Aspects of context were incorporated into the simulation design and were crucial in the 
experimental strategy. Participants experienced identical “launch” context narratives. In the 
consideration of context, all possible percepts are indefinite (Coren, Ward, & Enns, 2003), and 
consequently meaning of a visual stimulus is ultimately constructed by the participant. 
Therefore, while the contextual cues for all participants started identically, the context varied 
when their vantages accommodated different views of objects in space. In all research, when a 
stimulus is presented, contextual circumstances surrounding the presentation contribute to the 
experience. Dey (2001) defines context as any information that can be used to characterize the 
circumstances or situation of an entity. An entity might be relevant to the interaction between a 
participant and the simulation and may or may not be manifest within the simulation itself, but 
the participant determines the perception and experience of relevancy. In basic NP research, this 
means that control of contextual variables is of utmost importance. 
The baseline study applied these principles of simulation context design in the 
development of the mixed-reality simulator and the conditions presented therein (Reinerman-
Jones et al., In press). Participants needed to pass “backstage” to enter the simulated launch 
station, passing by cameras, a large green screen (used for filming digital effects), and the 
equipment required to conduct numerous experiences in sight and sound. The experimenters 
presented the study in terms of simulated space travel, and worked to support the illusion through 
a narrative that reinforced the idea that the participant had been selected to have the unique 
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opportunity. Participants answered a battery of questionnaires chosen to collect information 
about multiple topics, including: attitudes of religiousness, dispositional tendencies, and 
sensitivity to simulator sickness. The experimenters worked to maintain the story narrative of an 
impending launch, even while placing neurophysiological sensors on the participant.  
Researchers collected real-time neurophysiological measurements using EEG, ECG, and 
fNIR while the participants observed the space scenes (Reinerman-Jones et al., In press). When 
the participant was ready to “launch” (an audio and visual experience, as the chair and capsule 
were stationary), the experimenter sat outside of the space capsule and could only be contacted 
through radio control. Computer monitors embedded in the walls of the capsule opened virtual 
portals revealing images of space, including Earth, and expanses of stars. After the participant 
viewed the images, the capsule “returned to earth” (relayed through radio control) and the 
participant answered questionnaires, repeating some of the questions that had been asked 
previously and introducing questions of workload. Experimenters removed all sensors and 
brought the participant to meet an interviewer. The interviewers were philosophy graduate 
students trained in phenomenological interview techniques. Interviewers escorted participants to 
another area for interviewing with the succinct goal of extracting first-person reports of spiritual 
and aesthetic experience. 
Identifying Method Improvements  
At the baseline study’s end, 16 males and 27 females (mean age = 20.3, SD = 2.03) had 
participated. From the beginning to the end, the baseline experiment was executed much like a 
relay race, with researchers passing the baton from one stage of the experiment to the next. The 
analysis of the collected data required a division of labor by the various contributing disciplines. 
Human factors psychology and neuroscience experts examined the results of the psychological 
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and neurophysiological measurements. Phenomenologists reviewed the transcripts and 
recordings of the interviews and conducted linguistic and philosophical analyses. The astronaut 
journals provided information about first-person experiences of awe and wonder and that starting 
point was used as a comparative linguistic evaluation of the participant interviews. The results 
showed promise. Participants who reported higher levels of religiousness (as indicated in the 
questionnaires) were more likely to report awe and wonder when viewing the Earth (as opposed 
to only stars). The findings provided support for what the researchers hypothesized: a connection 
between aesthetic and spiritual practice and real-time experience (Reinerman-Jones et al., In 
press). In early analyses, the results of the neurophysiological data indicated engagement of 
frontal lobes during the feeling of wonder and parietal lobes during physical affect. Participants 
who reported experiencing awe, wonder, religiousness or spirituality were compared to those 
who did not indicate such experiences. Specifically, theta activity varied significantly between 
experiencers and non-experiencers. Further, the experience of the two manipulations (vantages 
of deep space vs. vantages of Earth) resulted in significantly different frontal lobe beta, occipital 
lobe beta, left hemisphere beta, and right hemisphere beta. Experiencers and non-experiencers 
showed no significant differences with ECG or fNIR for comparing Earth and Deep Space. 
Further, participants who viewed Earth were more likely to report spiritual and aesthetic 
experience than those who viewed deep space.  
The problem is not that the results lacked merit. To the contrary, the results provided 
information about human phenomena that otherwise have garnered little empirical exploration to 
date. The results of Space, Science, and Spirituality contribute to a compelling case in favor of 
further exploration using NP. The work supports the application of open-ended interviews for a 
broader range of basic-research contexts. However, the methods of the baseline may have limited 
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the reportable finding. Regardless, the experiment provides “lessons learned” for improving NP 
methods in hopes of generating more conclusive results.  
Lesson #1 
NP experimentation must purposefully and systematically include the creation and 
maintenance of shared mental models (SMM). 
Neurophenomenological research must embrace systematic and thorough creation of 
SMM as part of the neurophenomenological project in the research world. Its intrinsically 
interdisciplinary nature demands that contributing domain experts avoid the “passing the baton” 
approach that can result in a mere collection of data in a non-contextualized way. While there are 
various approaches to establishing, articulating, and maintaining SMM (c.f. Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas, & Converse, 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2000) all include a need for the model to facilitate elucidation, clarification, and 
prediction to benefit team performance (Bockelman Morrow & Fiore, 2013). SMMs support 
collaboration and coordination (Elias & Fiore, 2012), thereby helping the individual team 
members carry out roles and adapt to unexpected circumstances. 
As described in the previous section, our team for the baseline experiment consisted of 
human factors psychologists, philosophers, art historians, astronauts, simulation developers, and 
computer engineers. Each contributing member adds value, but entered the collaboration with 
differing vocabulary or semantics for concepts and constructs.  
With the varied perspectives, the team must find common ground. The 
neurophenomenological approach can only be accomplished with all contributing members 
operating with a shared lexicon and conceptual framework. That is achieved by considering 
specific techniques for accomplishing the SMM according to the group and its circumstances. In 
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preparation of a second study, the following techniques were employed: concept mapping prior 
to experimentation, continued training of researchers regarding NP theories and methods, and 
preparing analyses to handle the complexities inherent to the neurophenomenological data. These 
are examples of techniques for addressing the needed SMM. Logistically, these take time. As is 
the case with most successful interdisciplinary endeavors, scheduling regular meetings for 
brainstorming and teaching, as well as creating a glossary and conceptual framework document 
should be part of NP implementation. The outcome should not only be productive experimental 
collaboration, but also synthesized and sensible results. These integrative results stand in contrast 
to the individualistic pieces of interpretation from each domain’s perspective.  
Lesson #2  
NP experimentation should be held to the high standards of experimental design and 
execution to achieve variable control, reliability, generalizability, and replication of results. 
In the complexities of carrying out an interdisciplinary study with multiple parts, 
problems can arise. In the baseline study, there were many possible variables that could have 
explained components of the experience (e.g. launch narrative, the mixed-reality components of 
the simulator, and changes in setting between experience and interview). It was therefore 
impossible to determine the manipulations that generated various aspects of the experiences. In 
part, this problem in the baseline study was the result of inadequate SMMs mentioned above. 
Team members, working within the confines of their own specialized disciplines, were not 
always able to see the whole picture, and this had an effect on the overall design of the 
experiment. This, of course, is not inevitable, or necessarily a characteristic of other NP 
experiments, but that this problem did characterize the baseline study suggests that adopting 
different practices is something that needs to be made explicit. Accordingly, the second 
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methodological lesson is a reminder that psychology and the cognitive sciences already have a 
time-tested tradition of precision in experimentation and that neurophenomenology can benefit 
from attending to many of the practices involved in this tradition.   
As researchers design a NP experiment, they should consider many of the questions that 
their counterparts in traditional cognitive science might ask. For example, does it make sense to 
generalize first-person data? Cognitive scientists, with a firm footing in psychology, consider the 
extent to which any finding can be generalized to the population at large, and that consideration 
may affect the manner in which the data is both collected and handled. Neurophenomenologists 
need to grapple with that question as well, and avoid oversimplification of the factors that 
contribute to the results.  
In addition to generalizability, cognitive psychology also considers verification. A well-
formed NP study needs to consider procedures for the verification of subjective experience. In 
other words, is “experience” being captured the right way? The baseline study, due to the length 
of experimental sessions and the uniqueness of using the NP approach, only included one aspect 
from each field that compose neurophenomenology. In other words, neurological and 
physiological measures from neuroscience were used to assess one part of the participants’ 
experience (physiological response), questionnaires from psychology were used to assess another 
part of the participants’ experience (demographic information, traits, and cognitive response to 
the immersive environment), and phenomenological interviews from philosophy assess 
participants’ linguistic description of their experience in the simulation environment There was 
no overlap; no checks and balances. Strictly, this was a neurophenomenology study, but not an 
optimal application of NP methods, which thereby limit the power of the interpretation of the 
results. Again, to reiterate, the data attained from the baseline experiment is useful and 
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informative for the phenomenon under investigation as seen from each discipline, but perhaps 
short of the ideal of neurophenomenology.  
Depending on the study, other disciplines can provide complementary tools for 
verification. On its own, a Likert-scale of self-reported affect (a tool from psychology) will not 
capture lived experience. However, it can provide correlations and comparisons that in turn 
provide verification when interpreting the findings from the phenomenological interviews. When 
designing the experiment, researchers can incorporate established methods from psychology, 
taking care to avoid influencing the phenomenological interview. For example, a sliding 
qualitative scale of affect can be given after the phenomenological interview. The information 
from the scale can provide support to the textual analyses of the interviews. The scale cannot, on 
its own, capture unique lived experience, but it can add credence to the basic findings in 
neurophenomenology. 
Concerning using methods from cognitive science, researchers designing NP experiments 
must also consider the replicability of their experiments. For example, neurophenomenology has 
been used to explore experience in epileptic preictal states (Le Van Quyen & Petitmengin, 2002). 
In this example of applied neurophenomenology, the lack of control (variation between subjects) 
provides an explanation for any inability to reproduce results. After all, the patients were not 
being studied to capture generalizable aspects of preictal experience, but to improve the 
identification of preictal states in epileptic patients. The study not only made a significant 
contribution to epilepsy research, but it has also played an immeasurably valuable role in the 
lives of patients who benefited directly from participating in the study. However, basic research 
should typically include high levels of control and produce highly predictable and reproducible 
results, and this can also be accomplished with NP methods. One of the key objectives of 
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neurophenomenology is to function within experimentation. Therefore, attention must be paid to 
experimental rigor, precedence, and scientific acceptance. This understanding benefits the ability 
of a multi-disciplinary team to succeed in employing the NP approach. 
To do this, NP experimental design might include the embrace of simulation technology. 
Simulation test beds allow for high variable control and precise stimulus/response recordings, 
consequently increasing successful replication. Simulations can be shared between institutions, 
permitting more diverse population testing (and bringing the results higher generalizability as 
well). For example, the present experiment used a portable simulation environment. This form of 
immersive simulation allows the presentation to be packed up and taken to another location, so 
that other locales can benefit from the technique. It also is a straight-forward and relatively cost-
effective form of simulation presentation, so that laboratories with limited simulator resources 
can erect similar systems. A digitally controlled presentation of experimental stimuli allows for 
improved generalizability, replicability, and verification, and can thereby give more credence to 
the NP findings. Interplay between the phenomenological project and some techniques of 
cognitive science can generate a unique integrative methodology. As such, neurophenomenology 
should take the best of the practices of cognitive science, while contributing its unique 
techniques that have not been a common part of the cognitive science toolbox. 
Lesson #3 
The phenomenological interview places the impetus for training on the interviewer, not 
the participant, so that the interviewer may act to support the participant in precise experiential 
reporting.  
The third lesson to extract from the baseline study is that the question of 
phenomenological training should shift from focusing on the participant to the interviewer.  
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Though Lesson #2 argued for the importance of adopting specific practices from 
cognitive science, Lesson #3 involves the aspect of neurophenomenology that stands in contrast 
to traditional cognitive science. To work through the assertion of this lesson, it is essential to 
describe the role of training in the interview. The “training trade-off” depicts how the line 
between the interviewer and interviewee can dissolve, so that the interviewer actually 
participates in the reflection and articulation of experience. This participation on the part of the 
interviewer is a marked difference from the objective techniques of cognitive science and as such 
has potential for opening forms of data collection and analyses of experience that have not yet 
been fully explored. 
As discussed above, much NP research has been based on the idea that only a person 
trained in introspective or phenomenological techniques can provide details with the degree of 
precision required for meaningful results (cf. Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2007; Varela & Shear, 
1999). Petitmengin’s (2006) technique strays from that position and accommodates information 
from untrained participants. The baseline experiment and the present experiment adhered to the 
general interview techniques found in Petitmengin (2006). One of the observations made from 
the baseline experiment is that this is not a training binary (i.e., participants either are capable of 
good phenomenological reflection or completely lack self-awareness), but a continuum. This 
observation was attained in reviewing the interview transcripts. The questions asked directly 
influenced the articulations from the participants. The interviewer’s use of follow-up 
paraphrasing supports further reflection by the participants. The level of phenomenological 
training in terms of mental awareness on the part of the participant leads to a “training trade-off” 
(Figure 4) in respect to the interviewer. The less experienced the participant (to the limit of never 
having practiced phenomenological reflection), the more training the interviewer needs in ways 
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to help draw out the experience while carefully avoiding any priming of the participant. The 
opposite is true as well: a participant well-trained in introspection, reflection, or mindfulness 
might not require a highly skilled interviewer to draw out the experiential data.  
 
Figure 4. The training trade-off puts a greater demand on the interviewer to assist the 
inexperienced participant in the process of articulating lived experience. 
 
The impact on methodology is that the emphasis shifts from a question about the degree 
of training a participant does or does not receive. This degree of self-awareness cannot be 
controlled in participants with the interview approach. Instead, the onus for training is placed on 
the interviewer. The training trade-off is compensatory, in that the interviewer’s skill will 
improve the chances of the untrained participant’s articulation of her experience. If the 
interviewer is working with Buddhist monks, she may not need to receive a great deal of training 
and may be able to tell the participant the focus of the study. Conversely, if the same interviewer 
is working with undergrads at any given university in the West, she may need to pull from a 
collection of tools and techniques to give the participant the capacity to access the thoughts and 
feelings experienced. Further, when working with an untrained participant, the interviewer might 
not benefit from revealing the purpose of the study, as it could easily bias a participant. 
Inexperienced 
participant: 
 Higher training demand 
placed on interviewer 
Experienced participant: 




It should be noted that, while the training trade-off is presented primarily as a 
methodological lesson, it has important theoretical weight as well. The dynamism between 
interviewer and participant has value for the debate regarding phenomenological 
experimentation. The dynamic interaction demanded by the NP interview method is not part of 
traditional cognitive science. In the NP interview, a cognitive off-loading occurs by the 
participant onto the interviewer that traditional psychology does not always recognize. The 
phenomenological interviewer has the power, if executed in the manner described herein, to do 
some of the cognitive work of focusing the participant precisely on the participant’s lived 
experience, a task that may be otherwise very difficult for the untrained participant. This is not 
one of the tools of traditional cognitive psychology. Introspection, as employed by psychologists, 
involves training the participant to look inward. The goal, in such cases, is not to extrapolate a 
description of an experience itself. Rather, interview questions are tools used, perhaps by applied 
psychologists/therapists, but certainly not typically by basic researchers. When 
neurophenomenologists employ the interview, it is a core method that is fundamentally part of 
the experimental approach. As such, it changes the way first-person experiential data is captured 
and handled. 
This does not degrade the first-person experience, treating it as third person data (as 
Dennett [1991] suggests science requires). Instead, the interviewer actually engages (in a second-
person way) to preserve the first-person experience. The goal of the interviewer is not to remain 
an objective third-person observer (an important aspect of cognitive science methods); the goal is 
to assist the participant in “opening” to her own experience. The interviewer can do the cognitive 
work of keeping the reflection on target, exploring the experienced thoughts, emotions, and 
sensations of the participant, as the participant would do on her own if she were trained to do so. 
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Properly trained interviewers eliminate the need for participant training. The interviewer assumes 
the cognitive burden necessary for reflection. The interviewer is essentially doing a share of the 
processing, interactively working to assist the participant in accessing her own experiences. In 
this process, there is no need for the interviewer to ascribe any mental states to the participant, or 
to engage in mindreading (understood in the standard way in social cognition); nor is there a 
need for the interviewer to access her own mental models or simulations of what the other’s 
mind is. The interviewer, quite plainly, participates, interactively, in the articulation of the 
participant’s experience. In this regard, the scientific concept of bias is important to eliminate. 
This requires interviewers to know the scientific method and the need for controlling extraneous 
variables. Language (with support of second-person pronouns used by the interviewer) directs 
the naïve participant toward accessing the embodied memory of the experience, just as 
experience in mindfulness training would allow the expert meditator to access the experience 
independently. Traditional cognitive science often tries to force the participant into an objective 
mold of predesigned conceptual frameworks. In contrast, the interactions of the interview allow a 
switch of directions altogether and temporarily allows the researcher to participate in the 
articulation of the participant’s subjectivity. The resulting interview can make manifest an 
experiential record that traditional methods cannot reveal.  
Consequently, the third lesson involves a “training trade-off” in integrating the interview 
into experimental design and execution. NP methods can work with this adjustment in focus 
from the participant to the interviewer, and the re-evaluation needed for each unique experiment. 
The interviewers can pull from multiple tools and techniques with the aim of eliciting the 
required acts of reflection and articulation. Petitmengin (2006) outlines many of the practical 
techniques, but in the contexts of specific experiments, one has to consider how such techniques 
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can be put to use. Interviewers should be subjected to rigorous training and rehearsal to prepare 
them for the interview tasks. This training should include an assessment of the anticipated 
personalities and behavioral idiosyncrasies likely to be expected by a given population of 
participants. That assessment would direct the focus of the training, so that interviewer responses 
to anticipated barriers would become more natural and automatic. Training should also include 
mitigation of interviewer personality quirks that might otherwise influence interactions. The 
baseline study interview transcripts revealed that one interviewer was more extroverted and used 
more informal language than the other two interviewers, which seemed to elicit different 
responses, perhaps because of perceived rapport by the participants. The interviewer should 
behave as if she is a prosthetic for the participant and the questions must support that 
participant’s exploration of her experience without imposition of the interviewer’s bias. These 














Table 1. Lessons learned during first experiment and applied to second. 
 Lesson description Lesson application 
Lesson 1 NP experimentation must purposefully and 
systematically include the creation and 
maintenance of Shared Mental Models 
(SMM). 
 
1. Team training to prepare research 
assistants in phenomenology 
2. Increased communication efforts 
to support interdisciplinary 
collaboration and coordination 
Lesson 2 NP experimentation should be held to the 
high standards of experimental design and 
execution to achieve control, reliability, 
generalizability, and replication of results. 
 
1. Higher control of variables through 
simulator modifications 
2. Greater sample size 
3. Emphasis on portability in testbed 
design, for potential replication 
within different populations 
4. Development of new metric to 
compare phenomenological and 
psychological reports of experience 
(ESSE) 
Lesson 3 The phenomenological interview places the 
impetus for training on the interviewer, not 
the participant, so that the interviewer may 
act to support the participant in precise 
experiential reporting. 
1. Implemented systemic training 
accountability for interviewers 
2. Conceptualized the “training-
tradeoff” to capture the shift of 




The literature relevant to the present study comes from numerous domains and academic 
traditions, but there are strong commonalities. The literature reviewed herein provides a glimpse 
into the breadth of approaches to the problem of experience. The review included a history of 
NP, including the controversy concerning its place in the science of conscious experience. Of 
particular value to the present study is the question concerning cognitive science and whether NP 
contributes anything that is not already part of the methodological toolbox of cognitive science. 
Aspects of neurophenomenological methodology will be evaluated through integrating the 
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contributing disciplines and applying the “lessons learned” to improve upon a baseline 
experiment. This does not assume that all NP must adopt every portion of the lessons learned, 
but that the present work yielded substantial results in a readily replicable manner.  
The experiment acted as a “proof of concept” by providing a ground-level example of the 
way first-person data can be collected and handled when using a simulation test bed to examine 
experience. There is no assumption that the methodological approach is a one-size-fits all 
solution to every possible exploration of experience. However, an intentional integration of 
disciplines, combined with a careful application of Petitmengin’s interview approach (even if 
modified within the specifics of an experimental design) should be considered broadly in NP 
research endeavors. There is no criticism of past works implied by this statement; rather, there is 
a desire to build on NP’s historical successes while seeking a wider research audience in which 
to pursue similar endeavors. The present study offers a methodology that is a portable, 




CHAPTER THREE: EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
Hypotheses for Present Experiment 
H1: The focal simulation condition will elicit participant reports of greater experiences of 
AWCH than the global simulation condition. 
H2: The focal simulation condition will elicit greater changes in neurophysiological 
responses than the global simulation condition. 
H3: AWCH experiences will correlate with neurophysiological responses. 
 
To test the hypotheses, researchers conducted an NP experiment to evaluate multi-source 
neurophysiological and psychological experiential data collected during the observation of Earth 
from space within an immersive virtual simulator. 
Participants 
Recruitment Methods 
The researchers recruited a total of 74 participants from the University of Central Florida 
(UCF) via the psychology SONA system. The ages ranged between 18 and 32 years. The 
research targeted no vulnerable populations. Total participation time was approximately 2.5 
hours. Individual speed of questionnaire completion, time for acquiring appropriate impedance 
levels on the EEG, and individual differences in interview discourse contributed to variation in 
time to complete the experiment. Participants were healthy, fluent English speaking adults over 
18 years old from the UCF community. Research restrictions (Appendix A) controlled for certain 
individual differences by excluding some participants from the study. Participation required 
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normal or corrected to normal vision, as visual immersion was critical to the simulation 
experience. Alcohol consumption within 24 hours or caffeine consumption within 2 hours prior 
to the study excluded participation, as these substances could influence performance and/or 
perceptual sensitivity. The SONA registration system communicated the restriction criteria to 
participants prior to registration. 
Experimental Equipment 
Researchers conducted experimentation within Northrup Grumman’s Virtual Immersive 
Portable Environment (VIPE, Figure 5). The VIPE space provided a 7ft. tall, 120 view. The 
participants were in a low-profile (gaming-style) chair during the visual simulation, so that the 
natural vertical and horizontal range of view surrounded the periphery within the panoramic 
projection.  
 




In a 1×1 experimental design (groups assigned between either a focal or a global view of 
Earth) with repeated measures on the first variable, each participant received a control and 
counterbalanced condition. Participants completed a familiarization period in order to acclimate 
to the environment, and then one of two experimental conditions. That presentation order was 
consistent for the optimization of recall and the control of effect size from the magnitude of the 
viewing area. During the familiarization period, participants viewed a geometric shape moving 
distally with the same rate and direction and similar light contrast as was used in the 
experimental visuals. In experimental condition 1 (FOC), participants viewed an image of the 
earth moving distally, with a starting point near-earth and finishing with the entire globe in view 
from space (Figure 6). Specifically, participants’ perspective began at UCF using satellite images 
perspective, and slowly withdrew from the earth, completing with a space-view of Earth. In 
experimental condition 2 (Global), participants viewed the earth from near-space, with the 
eastern hemisphere in partial view. This condition began with a near-space vantage and move 
outward to the same space-view of Earth as the first group. In both experimental conditions, the 
image moved at the same pace in both orbit and trajectory, and contained similar light/dark. All 
conditions lasted for 7 minutes each. All simulation conditions used original digital animation 
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Figure 6. Panoramic images for space simulator 
Dependent Variables 
Measurements were collected through neurophysiological, psychological (i.e. surveys 
and questionnaires), and phenomenological sources. Dependent variables were measured along 
three disciplinary lines: Physiology, Psychology, and Phenomenology. A description of the 
interdisciplinary tools follows. 
Neurophysiology 
Neurophysiological measurements used multiple sources of input: 
Electroencephalography (EEG), electrocardiography (ECG), and functional near-infrared (fNIR). 
These tools provided high degrees of temporal sensitivity to change without interference with the 
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first-person experiences during stimulus presentation. The B-Alert X10 wireless EEG (Figure 7) 
collected data from brain activity across nine channels, with sensors placed bihemispherically in 
frontal, parietal, and occipital lobes. Specifically, alpha, beta, and theta waves were recorded for 
EEG and Heart Rate Variability (HRV) and Interbeat Interval (IBI) were recorded for ECG.  
 
Figure 7. The B-Alert nine channel EEG. 
 
The left and right hemisphere oxygenation was recorded using the Somantec INVOS 
oximeter (Figure 8).  
 




A variety of questionnaires from the psychology domain were used. At the beginning of 
the session, participants complete the Ishihara Color Blindness Test (Ishihara, 2010) to ensure 
typical color vision.  
Prior to stimulus presentation, participants completed a computerized series of 
questionnaires. The questionnaires issued prior to the experimental conditions were selected to 
avoid priming and focused on personality traits pertinent to the present study. The Multiple 
Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance scale (MSTAT; McClain, 2009) is a 22 item measure that 
determines an individuals’ tolerance for ambiguity. The Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS; 
Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) is a 34-item instrument that measures participants’ openness to 
absorbing self-altering experiences in seven scales: Responsiveness to Engaging Stimuli, 
Synesthesia, Enhanced Cognition, Oblivious/Dissociative Involvement, Vivid Reminiscence, and 
Enhanced Awareness.  
After all conditions were presented, participants completed the Experiment-Specific 
Survey of Experience (ESSE), which is a demographic and experiential survey designed in-
house to provide quantitative data of the first-person experience. This questionnaire was 
developed to provide additional quantitative support for the pertinent aesthetic and spiritual 
constructs specific to the present study. The ESSE was a computer administered questionnaire 
that asked explicitly about the hermeneutically-derived categories. The ESSE explicitly asked 
participants the degree to which they self-identify as a “spiritual person”, “logical person”, and 
“religious person.” Then, participants were given the formal definitions (as described in Chapter 
One). They were asked to what extent they agreed with a statement such as “While viewing the 
presentation today, I experienced AWE.” They indicated the degree to which they experienced 
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AWCH on a 100-point sliding Likert-scale. If participants indicated an experience greater than 
10 (on the 100 scale), then they were issued an automatic follow-up regarding the time in the 
simulation when they experienced that category. For example, the prompt would read, “I 
experienced AWE the most when viewing: a) close images of the Earth (toward the beginning of 
the video); b) distant images of the Earth (toward the end of the video); c) the image of the 
geometric shape.  
Finally, participants completed the Brief Multidimensional Measure of 
Religiousness/Spirituality (BMMRS; Idler et al., 2003), a 34-item measure that evaluates 
religiousness/spirituality in seven areas: Experiential Comforting Faith, Negative Religious 
Interaction, Personal Spirituality, Punishing God, Religious Community Support, Private 
Religious Practices, and Forgiveness. The BMMRS is a reverse-scored survey, and the 
categorical questions included items where the participant was asked to agree/disagree with 
statements about private religious practices (e.g. “Besides religious services, how often do you 
take part in other activities of a religious nature?”). Therefore, the higher score on the part of the 
awe experiencers indicates that they indicated lower levels of private religious practices. See 
Appendix B for a collection of all surveys and questionnaires used. 
Phenomenology 
A post-stimulus interview, based on Petitmengin (2010), was conducted to collect first-
person recollections of the experience during the simulation. Immediately following the 





To support continuity, the research assistants responsible for conducting the 
neurophysiological and psychological aspects of the experiment also conducted the post-stimuli 
interview. Interviewers were trained to focus on descriptive terms and seek clarity of those terms. 
Researchers led the interviewee to avoid judgments and self-analysis, as the desired report did 
not concern their opinions of their experiences, rather descriptors of the experience. The research 
assistants used the phenomenological guide (Appendix C) to provide support during the 
interview. Interviewers listened to the experiential descriptions, and ask questions such as, 
“What did that feel like?” to elicit the category and orientation responses. When a participant 
indicated an experience, the interviewer would ask for more detail. These methods allowed the 
participants to describe all of the experiences in the simulation in detail and provided first-person 
qualitative data. A textual analysis method categorized expressions into abstract categories and 
orientation of experience.Participant responses were categorized according to the articulated 
experiences (spiritual, religious, aesthetic, AWCH). The groups were clustered by using the 
hermeneutic categories and subcategories of related constructs. For example, the group of awe 
experiencers would include those persons who explicitly used language including “awe” and 
those who experienced component subcategory constructs such as fascination, surprise, and 
overwhelm. To be clustered as a religious-experiencer, the participant needed to mention God or 
another distinctly religious construct explicitly while talking about the experience of viewing the 
experimental condition. For the other categories, participants expressed constructs listed in 




The inclusion criteria was provided to potential participants on Sona (the University of 
Central Florida’s participant database) before a person registers for participation. Upon arrival 
participants were confirmed for meeting the inclusion criteria and read the consent form. 
Informed Consent was provided to the participants before neurophysiological sensors applied. 
A research assistant then equipped the participants with the neurophysiological sensors. The 
EEG cap with ECG electrodes were applied. Additionally, the research assistant fitted 
participants with fNIR sensors. Next, participants completed a five-minute resting baseline for 
the neurophysiological measures. This was required to calculate change scores for the 
neurophysiological measures during the scenarios. The baseline was conducted with eyes open, 
and participants were instructed to maintain a relaxed focus forward. 
Participants completed the MSTAT, TAS and demographic questionnaires prior to the 
simulation. The participants observed two visual simulations. First, all participants completed a 
familiarization period to become acclimated to the simulation space. Then, an experimental 
condition was presented, counterbalanced from the two manipulations of imagery of earth.  
Upon completed viewing of the specified visual display, the neurophysiological sensors 
were removed and a phenomenological interview was conducted to ask the participants about 
their experience during the simulation. The interview was audio recorded and saved for later 
transcription. The study was completed with participants answering the ESSE and BMMRS. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
After the data was collected, it was analyzed by methods from each contributing domain. 
The goal was to use the tools of the three main lenses to re-focus the results from a distinctly NP 
perspective (Figure 9). The results section is organized by these links. First the psychological 
surveys are connected to the neurophysiological findings. Then, the neurophysiological results 
are presented with the phenomenological findings. Finally, the phenomenological and 
psychological results are presented in light of one another. These dyadic connections allow for 
an integrated analytic method, appropriate to the form of NP engaged herein.  
 












Psychological and Neurophysiological Results 
The following section provides an overview of the experimental results regarding 
neurophysiological activity during the observation of the space simulation. First, analyses were 
conducted to examine the effect of the condition on neurophysiological behaviors over 
simulation time. This addresses the experimental manipulations. Then, the neurophysiology is 
compared to self-reports from the psychological metrics. These analyses address the questions of 
the nature and structure of experience, as posed by the neurophenomenological method, by using 
psychological reports to assist in the interpretation of the neurophysiological findings.   
Condition by Minute for Hemisphere 
A 2x7 (condition: focal and global by minute: 1-7 min of simulation viewing) mixed 
ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted for each EEG hemisphere by 
frequency (alpha, beta, and theta) and for each fNIR hemisphere RO
2 
to identify any 
physiological difference between conditions and processing requirements for the duration of the 
simulation. This will be used to consider the efficacy of the methodological changes. The results 
also help determine the impact of the visual stimuli on processing requirements and the influence 
of time on cognitive resource demands. Due to technical challenges, the sample size for EEG 
was 68 and for fNIR was 72.  
First, the effect of condition by minute on left hemisphere was examined by frequency. 
For left hemisphere alpha, SPSS’s Greenhouse-Geisser was applied to correct for violations of 
sphericity. The main effect for minute during simulation time was significant, F (3.634, 
239.864), p < .001. The main effect for condition on left hemisphere alpha was not significant. 
The interaction for minute by condition was not significant. Data from the left hemisphere beta 
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also showed a violation of sphericity and was corrected using SPSS’s Greenhouse-Geisser. The 
main effect for minute during simulation time was not significant. However, the main effect of 
condition on left hemisphere beta was significant, F (1, 66),  p = .016 and interaction for minute 
by condition was significant, F (3.560, 234.961), p < .001. The third frequency, theta, also 
demonstrated a need to correct sphericity. Consequently, degrees of freedom were corrected 
using SPSS’s Greenhouse-Geisser estimate.No significance was found for main effect of minute, 
condition, nor interaction for minute by condition. 
For the right hemisphere, the effect of condition by minute was also analyzed. Violation 
of sphericity was corrected using SPSS’s Greenhouse-Geisser estimate. The main effect of 
minute during simulation time was significant, F (2.393, 157.965), p < .001. The main effect of 
condition on right hemisphere alpha was not significant. The interaction for minute by condition 
was not significant. For beta, sphericity was corrected using SPSS’s Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimate. The main effect of minute during simulation time was not significant. The main effect 
of group on right hemisphere beta was not significant. In right hemisphere beta, the interaction 
for minute by condition was significant, F (3.560, 114.864), p < .022.  For theta DFB, sphericity 
had been violated, therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using SPSS’s Greenhouse-
Geisser estimate (ϵ = .340). The main effect of minute was not significant. The main effect of 
group on right hemisphere theta was not significant. The interaction for minute by condition was 
not significant. 
For fNIR data, left frontal lobe data was corrected for violation of sphericity using 
SPSS’s Greenhouse-Geisser estimate The main effect of minute during simulation time was 
significant, F (2.328, 153.627), p = .006. The main effect of group on left hemispheric 
oxygenation was not significant. The interaction for minute by condition was not significant. 
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Likewise, right frontal lobe data was corrected for spericity using SPSS’s Greenhouse-Geisser 
estimate . The main effect of minute during simulation time was not significant. The main effect 
of group on right hemispheric oxygenation was not significant. The interaction for minute by 
condition was not significant. 
To determine the condition and minute most influential to physiological experience, 
significant EEG results were further analyzed by post-hoc comparisons using one-way between 
subjects ANOVAs with Welch’s F correction applied when needed to correct for non-
homogeneity of variance. The following takes a closer look at alpha, beta, and theta by minutes 
one through seven.  
EEG 
EEG data was reported as difference from baseline (DFB), unless otherwise noted. 
Left Hemisphere  
The left hemisphere alpha differences between the FOC and GLO conditions were 
significant during the second minute F (1, 67) = 4.423, p = .039; FOC (M= -8006.92) < GLO 
(M= -4997.41). Significant differences were also recorded during the seventh minute: F (1, 66) 
=4.040, p = .049; FOC (M= -6458.06) < GLO (M= -3731.10). No other minutes were 
significantly different between conditions for alpha left hemisphere. 
During the second, third, and seventh minutes, there was a significant effect of condition 
presentation on left hemisphere beta. Left hemisphere beta during minute two was significantly 
different between conditions, F (1, 67) = 18.639, p .001; FOC (M= -1342.86) < GLO (M= 
388.10). A difference was found in this region during the third minute, F (1, 67) = 14.238, p = 
.035; FOC (M = -755.83) < GLO (M = -133.070) and seventh minute F (1, 67) = 6.368, p = .014; 
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FOC (M = -914.825) < GLO (M = -184.498). No significant differences were found for minutes 
one, four, five, and six. 
No significant differences were reported between conditions by minute for the left 
hemisphere theta. 
Right Hemisphere 
No significant differences were reported between conditions by minute for the right 
hemisphere alpha. 
Significant differences between conditions by minute for the right hemisphere beta were 
found for minutes two and three. In minute two, the difference was significant F (1, 67) = 
17.245; p < .001; FOC (M = -1128.564 ) < GLO (M = 623.349 ) and minute three F (1, 67) = 
5.647; p = .020; FOC (M = -609.296 ) < GLO (M =103.237 ). No other minutes showed 
significant differences between conditions for right hemisphere beta. 
No significant differences were recorded between conditions by minute for the right 
hemisphere theta. 
Condition by Psychological Self-Reports  
Between groups (condition: FOC and GLO) ANOVAs were run to determine if the 
visuals of the condition had an impact on spiritual and aesthetic reports. This was an important 
analysis to run because modifications in the methodology from the baseline experiment 
suggested that earth views were more engaging and elicited greater affective responses. 
Therefore, this analysis helps determine the role of the image of earth itself in eliciting these 
responses. No significant effects were found for the ESSE metrics on self-identification as 
“spiritual person,” “logical person,” “religious person,” or “reflective person.” AWCH also had 
no significant differences by group. There was no significant difference reported for familiarity. 
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Hemispheric Behavior by Psychological Reports 
As the driving questions for the present study focus on the nature and structure of 
aesthetic and spiritual experiences, including AWCH, and because no significant effect on the 
elicitation of those experiences were found from the conditions as reported on the ESSE, it is 
important to examine other influences. Therefore, the following analyses collapsed across both 
conditions to understand the relation between time, physiological response, and reported 
experience. This extends the assertion from the baseline study that time is a factor in having 
aesthetic and spiritual experiences. 
Correlations were run between self-identified spiritual, religious, and logical persons to 
check for construct independence to better understand the difference, or lack thereof. These 
correlations will also become important later in discussing the phenomenological interviews. 
Participants who self-identified as “spiritual” also identified themselves as “religious” at 
a significant level (r = .764, p < .001). They also significantly indicated experiencing wonder (r 
= .253, p = .037), but there was no significant correlation with the awe, curiosity, or humility.  
Self-identification as “spiritual” (Error! Reference source not found.) correlated with 
FB changes in theta activity in the left hemisphere during the second minute (r = .259, p = .033) 
and the sixth minute (r = .264, p = .029). Theta differences from baseline were correlated in the 
right hemisphere for the “spiritual” participants. Significant correlations were recorded for the 
second minute (r = .334, p = .005), fifth minute (r = .282, p = .020), sixth minute (r = .267, p = 
.028), and the seventh (r = .291, p = .016). 
 
The self-identification of “religious” correlated with awe (r = .290, p = .016), but not 
wonder, curiosity, or humility.  
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 “Religious” self-identification correlated significantly with theta changes in the left 
hemisphere during the fourth minute (r = .242, p = .047), fifth minute (r = .281, p = .020), sixth 
minute (r = .320, p = .008), and seventh minute (r = .257, p = .034). In the right hemisphere, 
there were significant correlations with alpha DFB during the first minute, (r = .246, p = .043) 
and second minute (r = .252, p = .038). There were also significant correlations between self-
identification as “religious” and right hemisphere theta changes during the second minute (r = 
.298, p = .013), fifth minute (r = .282, p = .020), sixth minute (r = .277, p = .022) and seventh 
minute (r = .269, p = .027). 
Like “religious”, self-identification as “logical” correlated significantly with the survey-
reported experience of awe (r = .267, p = .028). “Logical” (Error! Reference source not 
ound.) also had a significant correlation with reported indications of familiarity (r = -.328, p = 
.006), whereas “spiritual” and “religious” did not. It also had a negative correlation with right 
hemisphere theta (r = -.249, p = .040). 
Visual Process Analysis Using Psychological Survey and Neurophysiology 
To demonstrate the potential improvements in the methodology, specifically the 
intersection of visual stimuli with time in the simulation, descriptive visualization of the ESSE 
data and distance from earth (associated with time in the simulation) are provided.  
The baseline demonstrated that a mixed-reality environment could elicit spiritual and 
aesthetic experiences. The present study, in response to the second “lesson learned” (see Chapter 
Two), reduced the sensory variables to only a visual stimulus. Consequently, it was critical to re-
establish the capacity of the new simulation to trigger experiences, like AWCH. The data 
collected in the present study confirmed that participants did experience AWCH, although they 
did not report significantly different degrees of these experiences on the ESSE. Of the total 
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sample (n = 74, male = 39, female = 35), reports from the ESSE indicated awe experiencers = 
70, wonder experiencers = 72, curiosity experiencers = 74, and humility experiencers = 62. 
Like the baseline, the present simulation did elicit AWCH, however, the between-
subjects design demanded consideration of the influences of the simulation timeline on the 
outcome. Because the central interest of the present study is experience and because the 
experimental conditions and the familiarization period occurred prior to the phenomenological 
interview, it was important to consider the elicitation of AWCH along the simulation timeline. 
The following descriptive data provides details regarding the role of simulation time on reported 
experience, because physiological results, when compared by group, must be understood in the 
context of what is being seen at any given moment. 
The results indicated that awe (Figure 10) and wonder (Error! Reference source not 
found.) emerge with a more distal view of the earth.  
 





"I experienced AWE the MOST when 
viewing..." 
close images of the Earth
(toward the beginning of
the video).
distant images of the
Earth (toward the end of
the video).





Figure 11. Simulation time for experience of wonder. 
 
Curiosity, however related less to the vantage of the earth, with a similar number of 
participants falling into each category (Figure 12). Every single participant, regardless of group, 
reported experiencing curiosity. This was the only category from the core AWCH categories that 





"I experienced WONDER the MOST 
when viewing..." 
close images of the Earth
(toward the beginning of
the video).
distant images of the
Earth (toward the end of
the video).





Figure 12. Simulation time for experience of curiosity. 
 
Humility had the highest percentage of participants in agreement as to its elicitation along 
the simulation timeline (Figure 13). Participants were very unlikely to report that they had 
experienced it while viewing the control condition and most reported experiencing it when 





"I experienced CURIOSITY the most 
when viewing..." 
close images of the Earth
(toward the beginning of
the video).
distant images of the
Earth (toward the end of
the video).





Figure 13. Simulation time for experience of humility. 
 
 To deliver a more cohesive account of experience (one that merges physiological and 
psychological data), correlations were conducted to capture aspects of the relationship between 
visual processing and first-person reports in the ESSE. This is different from the above LH and 
RH analyses. As the stimulus was exclusively visual, the researchers also analyzed areas 
involved in the processing of visual information, specifically the posterior parietal and anterior 
occipital lobes as collected from the P3, P4, and POz EEG sensors.  
Participant self-identification as “spiritual” in the ESSE correlated with changes in alpha 
during the first minute (r = .244, p = .045), second minute (r = .280, p = .021), sixth minute (r = 
.267, p = .028) and seventh minute (r = .330, p = .006). Changes from baseline in theta also 
significantly correlated with “spiritual” self-identification for the second minute (r = .319, p = 
.008), fifth minute (r = .315, p = .009), sixth minute (r = .267, p = .028), and seventh minute (r = 





"I experienced HUMILITY the MOST 
when viewing..." 
close images of the Earth
(toward the beginning of
the video).
distant images of the
Earth (toward the end of
the video).




Participant self-identification as “religious” in the ESSE correlated with alpha in the 
posterior parietal and anterior occipital lobes during the first minute (r = .245, p = .044) and 
second minute (r = .249, p = .040). Beta changes correlated with this category during the seventh 
minute (r = .277, p = .022). Significant correlations also were found in this region between 
“religious persons” and those who did not self-identify as “religious” for theta DFB during the 
fifth minute (r = .291, p = .016) and seventh minute (r = .270, p = .026). 
Self-identification as “logical” in the ESSE negatively correlated with DFB alpha for this 
region during the seventh minute (r = -.241, p = .048). There was also a negative correlation with 
the last two minutes in theta change: sixth minute (r = -.262, p = .031) and seventh minute (r = -
.288, p = .017). There was no significance found for a relationship with alpha in the posterior 
parietal and anterior occipital lobes and “logical” self-identification.  
Neurophysiological and Phenomenological Results 
Value of Individual Differences 
The following results draw from the methodological practices of using individual 
differences to examine phenomena, while also integrating the phenomenological analyses. They 
are examples in the tradition of case studies and necessarily cannot be extended as generalizable 
to the whole population, but that is not the goal in this form of analysis. Rather, this technique 
allows for researchers to take seriously individual experiences as evident in the interview. To do 
this, participant interviews were analyzed, using the categories from the aforementioned 
hermeneutic analyses. These analyses revealed that some participants had articulated various 
degrees of spiritual and aesthetic experience.  
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High AWCH Experience vs. No AWCH, Examples 
Participant 14 (P14), a twenty-years-old female in the FOC group, expressed levels of 
experience in multiple hermeneutic categories including awe, contentment (e.g. tranquility, 
relaxation), overwhelmed, perspectival change, bodily sensations of floating, and scale effects 
(e.g. vastness of universe, feeling of smallness within the vast). During the interview process, the 
interviewers employed reflective language and open-ended questions that avoided the prompting 
and biasing of participants from using vocabulary from any of the spiritual and aesthetic 
categories. The following interview excerpts provide examples of these expressions: 
“I think it was centered in on UCF and it comes out...and... I kind of like that feeling that 
it makes, I guess…. I don’t know, I just like the way you feel when you feel like you are floating 
…I’m comparing the earth to the stars, like what we see from earth type of thing. Um…and how 
we are just this little planet around all these stars, like it’s weird to me…I guess just like how 
small the earth is compared to everything in the universe. I guess I was also thinking of like how 
different it looks looking into Earth compared to being on Earth and looking up…just kind of uh, 
overwhelming, I guess...Cause it’s, I don’t know how exactly to describe it, it was just kind of 
surreal I guess how small earth is compared to everything else… The main thing that I was 
focusing on is, to me being on Earth it seems so big, but when you are really looking at Earth it’s 
just, it’s really small so it  um…it was just kind of like a "awe" moment type of thing…how small 
the earth really is and how I think everything is so big and important when really we're like the 
small little planet.” 
Participant 44 (P44), a nineteen-years-old female in the FOC condition, also indicated 
spiritual and aesthetic experiences during her interview. Her articulations included indications of 
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all four AWCH, in addition to various related categories in spiritual, religious, and aesthetic 
experience. 
“I was enjoying the different colors... like each star had like a different color, some were 
blue and some were like a white color. Then I noticed some of the other blue ones were 
moving...I just thought that they were really pretty and that, um, I kind of... I guess I wondered if 
those were real stars or if they were, um, just kind of a picture. I actually thought about the 
Hubbell telescope once and wondered if this was like a real picture from like the Hubbell 
telescope?...I guess I was wondering where...  what was taking this picture and, like making the 
formation. 
“It's kind of interesting to see because obviously you don't get that experience often 
because you're on Earth and so you're looking at Earth from being on Earth and walking around 
on it, but you don't really get that experience of looking down on it because very few people 
actually get to go into space so... 
“It's almost overwhelming to just see everything you're experiencing, the stars and the 
water and the different continents all at once, and so just looking... you're looking at pictures 
and saying, oh, this is China and, oh, this is what the sun looks like, and so instead you see like 
all of it all at once and you think, oh, this is what everything looks like put together… 
“… I guess when you see like a really pretty part of nature, like a waterfall or something. 
I guess, um, I kind of connect it to religion. I'm a Christian so I kind of connect it to God and 
how He's created these different places and He created the beauty, I guess, in your surroundings 
and stuff and there's just kind of a different perspective on the beauty that He's created, in my 
opinion…Um, I feel like for a split second I thought of, this must be like what God sees when He 
looks down on Earth, but I don't think I... I didn't linger on the God aspect of it, no. 
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“…when everything is changing so quickly, you have so many thoughts all at once and 
you're kind of thinking about everything and you kind of, in a way, you get over...you get 
overwhelmed with thoughts, but then at the end when nothing's...everything's pretty much the 
same and it's just now zooming out, you just kind of relax and you just take in the full picture 
instead of just little things at once.” 
Not every participant shared these experiences. For example, participant 64 (P64), a 
twenty-years-old male in the FOC condition, reported nothing that the reviewers could 
categorize into any of the determined hermeneutic categories. The same held for participant 65 
(P65), a twenty-years-old female who also indicated no spiritual, religious, or aesthetic 
experience. Such a high discrepancy in the reports could be dismissed as purely behavioral (i.e. 
the “non-experiencers” could not or would not report unique experience), but the physiological 
results should be similar as those from the participants. This is a question for individual 
differences. The following graphs provide comparisons between the example “experiencers” and 
“non-experiencers.” Each graph represents the participant EEG DFB in average power spectral 
density (PSD) shown over the one-minute simulation time blocks. The power spectrum refers to 
the frequency and amplitude of each signal. 
The frontal EEG sensors collected readings from the alpha, beta, and theta wavelengths. 
In frontal alpha (Figure 14), the experiencers (P14 & P44) showed greater suppression of frontal 
alpha than the non-experiencers (P64 & P65) did. The experiencers were both below the mean 
for frontal lobe DFB, whereas the non-experiencers had higher frontal alpha. The alpha readings 
were less distinct by experience over the central region (Figure 15). Alpha oscillations in the 
posterior regions (Figure 16) followed a similar pattern to those recorded from the frontal 
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Figure 16. Individual differences for EEG parietal/occipital alpha. 
 
The alpha findings were similar when analyzed by hemisphere. Alpha in the left and right 
hemispheres was above the mean (and closer to baseline) for the non-experiencers and below the 
mean for the experiencers. Of note were P65, whose alpha readings by hemisphere were 
statistically even with the baseline and P44 whose alpha stayed consistently below the baseline 
and mean by hemisphere. For the left hemisphere (Figure 17), P65 (M = 421.65) stayed 
statistically even with her baseline, whereas P44 (M = - 22,026.54) was below both her own 
baseline and the population mean (M = -7,748.91; SD = -11,515.40). Similar results were found 
in the right hemisphere (Figure 18), where P65 (M = -115.58) stayed statistically even with her 
baseline, whereas P44 (M = - 11,653.96) was below both her own baseline and the population 
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For the beta and theta wavelengths, the differences from baseline were not as ordered, 
with these experiencers and non-experiencers showing no significant difference or consistency 
across sides of the mean. These results suggest the functional utility of phenomenological data 
from the interviews in exploring individual differences for “experiencers” and “non-
experiencers.”  
It should be noted that this alpha pattern was not found in all participants who reported 
AWCH experiences. For example, P27 articulated experiences of AWCH, yet alpha DFB (left 
hemisphere M  =  -6616.48) was close to the population mean (M  =  -7355.37, SD = 11460.96) 
throughout the simulation. Inversely, P4 displayed alpha-suppression (M  =  -26699.76), yet did 
not explicitly articulate AWCH experiences. P4 did indicate in the ESSE that he experienced 
wonder, curiosity, and humility, each at 50 points on the 100 point scale. He also indicated on 
the ESSE that the simulation felt familiar (90 out of 100) and self-identified as a “reflective 
person” (60 out of 100) and “logical person” (100 out of 100). The Discussion chapter of the 
present work will explore possible explanations for these discrepancies. 
Phenomenological and Psychological Results 
The broad categories of “experiencer” and “non-experiencer” helped identify participants 
for individual difference analyses. However, the phenomenological categories also lend 
themselves to a refined analysis of the psychological data. Researchers conducted independent 
samples t-tests comparing experiencers or non-experiences of hermeneutic categories (AWCH, 
spiritual, religious, and aesthetic) with the responses to the psychological surveys. In other 
words, individuals were grouped as experiencers or non-experiences for each hermeneutical 
category based on the interview analysis. That grouping then served as a new independent 
variable to determine whether being an experiencer or not for each category leads to a difference 
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in reporting the experience within the scales of the ESSE, TAS, or BMMRS. This comparison 
helps to identify relationships between the phenomenological data and the, psychological data, 
thereby contributing both to the understanding of the constructs AWCH and the validation of the 
methodological changes from the baseline study.  
Spiritual, Religious, and Aesthetic experiences 
Participants who, during the phenomenological interview, articulated simulation-time 
experiences that were spiritual in nature were significantly less likely to describe themselves as 
“logical” in the ESSE; t(44.759) = 3.435, p = .001; spiritual-experiencers (n = 45, M = 72.13, SE 
= 3.292) < non-experiencers (n = 16, M = 88.13, SE = 3.291). There were no significant findings 
between the logical category and any of the other psychological metrics from the ESSE, TAS, or 
BMMRS. 
 Due to the rigorous categorical limitations, religious-experiencers occurred less 
frequently than spiritual-experiencers, but when they did, these participants were less likely to 
self-report being a “reflective person” in the ESSE; t(27.161) = -2.773, p = .010; religious-
experiencers (n = 6, M  = 84.67, SE = 2.472),<  non-experiencers (n = 55, M = 73.64 , SE = 
3.116). These participants reported higher levels of curiosity in response to the stimuli; t (11.581) 
= -2.871, p = .015, religious-experiencers (M = 89.17, SE = 4.167),> non-experiencers (M = 
74.31, SE = 3.069). Participants who described their experiences in religious terms had higher 
rates of negative religious interactions in the BMMRS (Idler et al., 2003) than their counterparts 
who did not use religious language during the interviews; t(21.423) = -2.486, p = .021; religious-
experiencers (M = 7.83, SE = .167),<  non-experiencers (M = 7.22, SE = .183). 
Aesthetic-experiencers spoke of their experiences while viewing Earth in terms of the 
sublime, sensations, and pleasure. However, these participants scored significantly lower in the 
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“sensory perceptual absorption” category of the TAS (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974); t(59) = 
2.292, p = .025; aesthetic-experiencers (n = 37, M  = 14.38, SE = .407), <  non-experiencers (n = 
24, M  = 15.83, SE = .477). There were no other significant results of the t-tests for aesthetic 
experience. 
AWCH 
After the phenomenological interview, participants who had expressed experiences of 
awe while viewing the experimental condition were categorized as “awe-experiencers” (n = 39) 
or non-experiencers (n = 22). The participants who expressed an experience of awe during the 
phenomenological interview were significantly more likely to have reported awe in their 
psychological surveys as well, t (34.018) = -2.374, p = .023; Awe experiencers (M = 19.69, SE = 
3.626) < non-experiencers (M  =  20.91, SE = 6.564). While there was no significant relationship 
to wonder and curiosity, participants who expressed awe reported greater levels of humility in 
their psychological surveys; t (39.00) = -2.356, p = .024; awe experiencers (M  = 63.74, SE = 
4.843) < non- experiencers (M  = 42.95, SE = 7.377). 
Participants who articulated awe during their interviews also had higher scores in “private 
religious practice” in the BMMRS (Idler et al., 2003); t (27.808) = -2.061, p = .049; awe 
experiencers (M  = 21.77, SE = .514), > non-experiencers (M  = 18.91, SE = 1.289). No other 
area on the BMMRS showed significance with the interview expressions of awe. 
Participants who expressed experiences of awe in the phenomenological interview also 
scored significantly lower in the “sensory perceptual absorption” category of the TAS (Tellegen 
& Atkinson, 1974); t(47.350) =  2.767, p = .008; awe experiencers (M  = 14.33, SE = .477) < 
non-experiencers (M = 16.05, SE = .395). The awe-experiencing participants were more likely to 
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answer “false” to questions like, “Textures- such as wool, sand, and wood- sometimes remind 
me of colors and music,” and “The crackle and flames of wood fire stimulate my imagination.”  
Participants who expressed wonder (n = 26) to their interviewers reported higher levels of 
awe in the ESSE; t (58.910) = -2.022, p = .048; wonder-experiencers (M  =  67.88, SE = 4.382), 
> non-experiencers (n = 35, M = 54.57, SE = .4.913). There was no significance found when 
comparing the groups to reports of wonder, curiosity, and humility in the ESSE, nor any of the 
other psychometrics. 
There was no significance found comparing the phenomenological articulations of 
curiosity and any of the psychometric results. 
Like the experiencers of awe, humility-experiencers (n = 26) scored lower in the TAS 
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) category of “sensory perceptual absorption” than non-experiencers 
(n=35); t(59) = 2.562, p = .013; humility-experiencers (M = 14.04, SE = .442), <  non-





CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION 
The present work is framed in a challenge to improve upon the methods employed by the 
baseline experiment. In this framework, the following discussion will examine the experimental 
results from the present study in light of the findings from the baseline. 
To begin piecing together the relationships between the psychological findings of 
experience and the physiological behaviors, the results of the survey need to be compared to the 
EEG and fNIR data. To look at this relationship between the body and the psychological reports, 
an analysis of variance was conducted to look for physiological differences between the FOC 
and GLO conditions. This was to examine the effect of the condition category on the 
physiological behaviors. Then, the physiological results were correlated with experiential 
indicators in the ESSE. 
The data from the two experiments suggests a complicated interplay of body and world in 
the generation and articulation of experience and these suggestions indicate aspects of the nature 
and structure of experience. The methodological approach applied herein created a picture of 











Table 2. Influences on experience. 
Categorical influence Supporting results 
Memory Cortical responses to context manipulation are evident in simulation 
time and create significant differences when viewing similar stimuli.  
Perception Differences in self-identification as a logical or spiritual person are 
evident in visual processing of simulation to opposing degrees of 
significance. 
Consciousness Some participants with greater alpha suppression DFBs articulated 
more spiritual and aesthetic experiences, likely due to more cortical 
interaction, than those with DFBs closer to their baseline values.  
 
Further, results suggest different biological mechanisms may be 
responsible for the complex manifestations of experience. 
Executive Function Working memory and attention while viewing Earth are suggested 
from frontal lobe behaviors during simulation time. 
 
The following sections aim to piece together the roles of memory, perception, 
consciousness, and executive function. As these relationships are considered, the influence of 
perception (both visual perception of the world and the internal perception of the self) are 
considered in respect to their influences on experience. First, results connecting visual perception 
and context are discussed. This leads into the self-identification indicators and the influence of 
self-perception on experience. Then, the results are considered for their contributions to moving 
forward in the larger neurophenomenological project by directing the field toward a clearer 
picture of the nature and structure of experience. Lastly, one final look at the experimental 
hypotheses will lead to the closing of the discussion including inferences from comparing the 
present and baseline experiments. 
Perceiving Context, Experiencing World 
Methodological adjustments from the baseline study culminated in a more tightly-
controlled experiment with an emphasis on the role that visual stimulus plays in experience. The 
visual manipulation implicated context, attempting to elicit different experiences by controlling 
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for a sense of location prior to the distant view of Earth. In the following section, the results are 
interpreted with the aim of merging the physiological, psychological, and phenomenological data 
to provide a clearer sense of the relationship between viewing Earth from space and spiritual 
constructs in articulated experience.  
To begin, the timeline plays an important role. While the proximal vantages of the earth 
in the GLO condition are the more distal vantages in the FOC condition, there was no 
statistically significant difference between groups for their ESSE experiential indications. 
Participants reported experiencing awe, wonder, and humility at later points in the simulation. 
Curiosity showed the least context-dependence, being implicated in relatively proportionate 
degrees during the acclimation and experimental times.  
The EEG results indicated that there was a difference for participants who began their 
simulation with a near-earth focal vantage and those who started the simulation with a broader 
view of the globe. To interpret these findings, each brainwave category (alpha, beta, and theta) 




Table 3. Summary of significant EEG findings for FOC and GLO conditions during the 
observation of the earth for a simulated space perspective. Artist representations of the involved 
regions are included to represent the cortical regions that showed significance 









Both groups experienced 
decreases in alpha, but the 
FOC group had a greater 
decrease during the second 










While beta decreased globally 
for the recipients of the FOC 
condition, beta increased for 
GLO during the first time 
segment. 
 
There was no difference 
during the middle portion of 
the  simulation. 
 
Both groups experienced 
drops in beta activity in the 
seventh minute, with the FOC 
decreasing significantly more 







Theta signals were not 
significantly different by 







With left hemispheric EEG significance captured at various times and across both alpha 
and beta frequencies, a discussion regarding the role of the manipulation should start with 
consideration of the left hemisphere itself. First, the left hemisphere refers to multiple regions of 
the brain left of the lateral fissure that are associated with a broad range of functions. The most 
useful approach, then, is to consider the functional associations most relevant to the work at 
hand. Perhaps, the most well-known contribution of the left hemisphere is its functional role in 
language (Vigneau et al., 2006). Both Wernike’s and Broca’s areas are located in the left 
hemisphere, associated with both receptive and expressive language function in approximately 
90% of all right-handed persons (Purves, 2008). Consequently, future studies ought to consider 
the role of the left-hemisphere during the encoding of experience and its subsequent role in the 
articulation of experience. From the theoretical vantage, this contributes to a picture of 
experience that is coupled to language, as one may experience in a manner that prepares for the 
later articulation of that experience.  
In addition to showing hemispheric shifts, Table 6 also presents the time segments by 
specific frequencies. It is useful to consider what might be implied by these differences. 
Alpha activity has been associated with a broad spectrum of conscious cortical activity, 
so there are numerous ways to explain the significance found along this bandwidth. The 
following aims to disentangle some likely explanatory candidates.  
Traditionally, alpha has been observed in “cortical idle” (Pfurtscheller & Lopes da Silva, 
1999), meaning alpha activity oscillates during alert awake states when one is not engaged in a 
task. In terms of the contextual change in conditions, the greater change of left hemisphere alpha 
in the FOC group suggests integration of context and perception. The vehicle for the contextual 
integration may be a combination of lexical and embodied factors. Changes in alpha signal in the 
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left hemisphere (Weems, Zaidel, Berman, & Mandelkern, 2004) have been associated with 
lexical retrieval. During the phenomenological interviews, participants recalled engaging in 
impromptu “gamification” of the stimuli while viewing the simulation, which may have been 
connected to lexical retrieval. The participants described trying to remember the names of 
landforms and bodies of water as the earth rotated. The alpha levels in the FOC group may also 
be explained in relationship to unpleasant visual movement (i.e. the rotation and lift simulated as 
the vantage moved from the earth to space) (de Toffol, Autret, Degiovanni, & Roux, 1990).  
Viewing negative stimuli can also cause a depression in alpha (Makarchouk, 
Maksimovich, Kravchenko, & Kryzhanovskii, 2011), possibly linked to limbic response. There 
was a drop in both groups, with a greater drop in FOC, potentially indicating an unpleasant 
affective response to the grounding of the experiential context to the local campus starting point. 
The early presence of this effect may be attributed to the sense of dizziness that some 
participants reported when the simulation moved quickly over land. However, the discrepancy 
also appeared at the end of the experiment, when the visual stimuli were quite similar. 
Participants were not informed how long the simulation would last. In another interpretation, 
alpha differences at the beginning and end of the simulation may be related to changes in lateral 
gaze as the simulation moved from a full screen image to focus in the center of the visual field 
(de Toffol, Autret, Degiovanni, & Roux, 1990). A final interpretation of these findings would be 
that the changes in alpha indicate shifts of task attention (Bonnefond & Jensen, 2012). In 
consideration of the role of context, the view of the campus may have helped the FOC group 
generate and maintain attention. This interpretation has important implications for research in 
vigilance work, as introducing contextual grounding into vigilance tasks may increase 
neurological attentive behaviors. 
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Global beta changes have been implicated in suppression of motor activity (Pogosyan, 
Gaynor, Eusebio, & Brown, 2009). GLO participants had a significantly higher beta at both the 
beginning and the end of the simulation experience. GLO participants may have experienced a 
reduction of motor response while viewing the condition, perhaps due to fewer physical 
affordances within the stimulus compared to the near-earth vantage of the FOC condition. The 
significant differences during the final minutes of the simulation are important. By the end of the 
simulation, the participants are viewing similar images with similar affordances (or the lack 
thereof). If the beta changes are indicators of motor suppression, this also suggests that context 
has some influence on subsequent motor action. 
Theta poses interesting interpretive challenges for studies involving quiet contemplation, 
like the present study, as it is associated with both meditation and sleep. This ambiguity was one 
of the primary motivators for the methodological clarifications concerning experimental design. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the findings from the baseline study showed significant findings 
in theta activity, but the researchers could not conclusively say whether these were the results of 
relaxed and thoughtful states or transitions to sleep. The baseline study is not alone in struggling 
with the interpretation of theta. In some cases, left hemisphere theta reduction has been recorded 
during hypnosis (Taddei-Ferretti & Musio, 1999) and suggests an increase in cognitive effort. 
Theta changes have been associated with meditative states, though studies conflict on the 
directionality of the changes for certain types of meditation (Cahn & Polich, 2006). The present 
study reduced the length of simulation time, hoping to reduce the likelihood of sleep. In the 
present work, drowsiness may explain the similar theta findings between groups as the 
simulation progressed, keeping in mind that for both conditions, the last few minutes were of a 
quiet, tranquil view of a slowly turning planet. The phenomenological interviews indicated that 
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many participants felt relaxed, and even sleepy, by the end of the experiment. The conditions of 
the experiment were relaxing, with no audio stimulation, low lighting, and, according to most 
participants, pleasurable visuals. Future work should disentangle the phases between thoughtful 
relaxation and drowsiness as it pertains to the first-person articulation of experience. 
FNIR measurements in the right frontal lobe also showed significant differences between 
groups during the two conditions. Again, the key is the timing. In the first minute, the significant 
differences are to be expected. The images are different, with the FOC containing various 
familiar images that, during the interviews, participants said they recognized. Many participants 
who received the focal condition also reported looking for places, (e.g. trying to locate a 
girlfriend’s apartment building or the route they take home). This type of engagement, or 
gamification could account for the differences in the frontal lobe behaviors, which are typically 
associated with executive function. Interviews from the GLO participants indicated a different 
sort of cognitive task, as they experienced a less familiar starting point. They started in darkness 
(similar to baseline, so it is not a surprise that there is less change from baseline here), and the 
first landscape images were not familiar. The vantage was over a red-toned landscape of Africa, 
and some participants reported thinking they were on Mars. The lack of familiarity at this stage 
may have made it more difficult to engage cognitively (Tulving, Markowitsch, Craik, Habib, & 
Houle, 1996). A similar issue of novelty versus familiarity may explain the differences during 
the fourth minute as well. However, this trend appeared throughout the experiment, even though 
the significance was only found during minutes one and four, suggesting an enduring effect of 
the initial contextual grounding on the subsequent frontal lobe behaviors. 
Neurological responses to context differences between the FOC and GLO conditions 
indicate previously unexplored features of experience as it applies to the observation of Earth in 
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a simulation environment. First, this contribution confirms the value of adhering to the second 
lesson learned by tightly controlling the variables. Additionally, there are implications for 
astronaut experience. These findings suggest that the grounded context, the notion of coming 
from “home” and moving into space, increase the neurological behaviors associated with both 
attention and relaxation. As the astronaut reports indicated experiences of peace and beauty, it is 
possible that the types of neural behaviors observed during the experiment are neural behaviors 
involved in transitioning from the anxiety of launch into a state that allows for more positive 
spiritual and affective experiences while in space. Astronauts maintain a contextual awareness 
that they are leaving a specific location on earth and they will return to a location. Results of the 
experiment suggest that contextual grounding is associated with differences in brain areas 
involved in attention, memory, and relaxation. However, while these findings begin to paint a 
picture of the neurological conditions associated with the experience of looking at Earth from 
space, they alone are not sufficient for describing the astronaut experiences of AWCH. To 
explore the nature of the spiritual and aesthetic experiences, these findings must be considered in 
their relationship to self-reports of the experiencers while viewing the simulation. 
Perceiving Self, Experiencing World 
To flesh out the fuller figure of AWCH (and retain focus on metheodological 
improvements by making a clear contribution to phenomenology of astronaut experience) it is 
essential to add the information collected from the participants in the form of their survey results. 
As the ESSE explicitly asked participants to report aspects of spirituality and AWCH, these 
reports were correlated to with the neural results. Among the more intriguing findings are the 
opposing correlative directions for visual processing-associated beta and theta behaviors in self-
identified “logical” people versus “spiritual” or “religious”. It seems that the spiritually inclined 
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person not only sees the world differently figuratively, but quite literally. In this study, person 
who considers herself “spiritual” or “religious” will largely behave differently on a 
neurophysical level than a person who more strongly identifies as “logical”. In interpreting these 
results, one must remember that the participants were free to identify with every, or no, category; 
that is, participants never needed to choose “spiritual” or “logical”. Consequently, the self-
identifications bound to neural behaviors are all the more intriguing.  
It raises numerous questions for further study: What are the implications of such literally 
different worldviews for sociological and political progress? Do other sensory modalities 
demonstrate such discrepancies (e.g. Does auditory processing vary in a similar pattern?). It will 
be valuable to replicate these findings. It is one thing to acknowledge that different cultures “see 
the world differently,” but it is an entirely new realm for investigation to consider evidence 
implying that our views of ourselves are so closely bound to our sensory experiences. Future 
work should examine causality: Do I see the world differently because I am a spiritual person? 
Alternatively, am I a spiritual person, because of the world I see? Perhaps, in such matters, 
traditional notions of causality begin to deteriorate altogether, and the act of exploring the 
relationship opens non-linear explanations for these relationships.  
More to the endeavor at hand, what does this self-perception say about the astronaut’s 
experience? One’s self-identification as spiritual, religious, and/or logical is bound to history, 
inseparable from episodic memories, schema for each construct, and culture. The neurological 
behaviors associated with experience are only partially the result of the stimulus. A large portion 
of the experience has to do with those things beyond the experimenter’s control, the things 
unique to each individual. However, being beyond the experimenter’s control does not mean that 
they are beyond the experimenter’s grasp. That is where the phenomenological interview rounds 
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out the toolkit of exploring experience. The tools of psychology and neuroscience tell us much, 
but they fall short of describing the experiences in the depth and fullness required. The 
phenomenological interviews support a broader sketch, an image of experience with movement, 
taking into account the complexities of individual differences.  
In this case, the physiological and psychological findings are supported by the 
phenomenological examination, in that participants who self-identified as “logical” were 
significantly less likely to express themselves in spiritual terms. Consequently, the issue extends 
into the nature of the interview itself. If a speaker gives a personal account from his or her 
personal perspective, in a way, the listener is exposed to a worldview that is more or less 
“spiritual” in experiential terms and that worldview is connected to the speaker’s self-view. Self-
identification may act as a type of perceptual filter for others and ourselves and as such, the 
interactive aspect of understanding others may allow us to frame other’s experiential accounts. 
Social signals indicating personality, culture, and other markers of self-identity, may give 
listeners some sort of information about speaker’s experience. For example, if social signals 
indicate something about my interlocutor, then I may more accurately frame and understand an 
experience that the speaker is sharing with me because I have direct access to those social signals 
even though I don’t have direct access to the experience. This is in line with the assertions of 
direct perception as articulated by Gallagher (2008) and Noë (2004). The self-described “logical” 
person not only sees something different, but also in conversation, invites the listener into a 
world that is shaped by that experience, so if the listener is not exposed to the stimuli, then the 
shape of the perceptual filter influences the second-person reception of the experience. The 
neurophenomenological approach contributes to a ground-level mapping of these difficult and 
entangled aspects of experience in an interactive world. 
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Toward the Structure of Experience 
As the larger project of phenomenology seeks to describe and explore the nature and 
structure of experience, the approaches of the present study must accomplish something toward 
that end. For the present work, the contributions toward the phenomenological project are 
arranged in terms of: categorical components, relational factors, and mechanisms of experience. 
Categorical Components 
The present study’s hermeneutic work clarifies the language used to represent and discuss 
the phenomena at hand while indicating components of experience. For example, the findings 
regarding awe showed a predictable connection between the ESSE’s indications of awe and 
those interpreted in the transcript analyses. However, these relationships did not hold so tightly 
for the other constructs of focus, wonder, curiosity, spirituality, and religion. This beneficial 
discrepancy points phenomenology in a certain direction; it holds a light up to specific categories 
that can be refined further in the attempt to capture a phenomena. There are two possibilities for 
why the discrepancies between the psychological and phenomenological first-person accounts 
might occur. First, the psychological tool may be considered a blunt instrument, and a straight-
forward question about AWCH may not provide the nuances of the hermeneutic categories; 
consequently, the constructs would not be as highly correlated. A second possibility is that there 
is ambiguity in the method of transcript analysis. Although the hermeneutic analyses were 
developed using inter-rater reliability methods, the transcripts were analyzed by single-rater 
experts. The use of expert evaluation  has been validated across multiple fields, with highly 
successful results (Bevan, 1995; Hardesty & Bearden, 2004; Stufflebeam & Webster, 1983), so 
the concern is not necessarily with the single-rater, but with the discrete scoring that the single 
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rater method created in this circumstance. With multiple raters, the scores and values can be 
presented in ranges or averages, which could allow for more flexible statistical comparisons with 
the Likert-scale values used in the ESSE.  
Further, the variances in experiential scale, as reported in the ESSE, suggest intensity is a 
factor in the ultimate experience. In future application, the interview analysis should include 
perceived intensity so that the categorical findings might be scaled. This would yield thresholds, 
so that experiential ranges may be more accurately identified. Intensity appears to be relevant to 
each category and subcategory of experience, even though it had been omitted from the 
hermeneutic models used. The present study contributes to the phenomenological project by 
capturing the value of intensity to the structural aspect of experience. 
In addition to intensity, the present study contributes categorical guidance by highlighting 
nuanced differences between components of experience. For instance, people who articulated an 
experience of awe were significantly more likely have indicated experiencing humility on their 
psychological survey. A finding like this is very important. The articulation of the markers of 
awe may not have correlated to an articulation of humility, but that sense of humility was still 
present and became something reportable through the ESSE. As there had been no significant 
relationship between experiencers of awe and experiencers of humility in the ESSE alone, it is 
through the analysis of the two data sources together that the connection in the articulation of 
some constructs and the underlying experiences emerges. These combinatorial analyses help to 
refine the hermeneutic categories, but more importantly, they direct researchers for future 





It is one thing to recognize pieces of a whole, but that is not enough to understand. That 
is, one can have all of the pieces for an automobile, but it takes an understanding of how those 
pieces fit together and their effects on one another when they do. So, as the previous section 
discussed the present contribution to identifying and clarifying categories of spiritual and 
aesthetic experience, now the discussion must shift to the relationships between categories.  
The relationships between categories of experience and other factors indicate that 
experience is highly dynamic and expressed in different ways. An example comes from the 
integration of the TAS results regarding sensory absorption and the phenomenological 
groupings. Researchers use the TAS (See Appendix B) to capture the types of conditions that 
might elicit absorption, and the category of “sensory perceptual absorption” identifies 
sensory/perception conditions. Contrary to what one might assume, aesthetic, awe, and humility 
experiencers scored significantly lower in sensory perceptual absorption. There are two possible 
explanations for this discrepancy, the first being methodological and the second, ontological. To 
the methodological explanation, this may be a simple difference between what the metrics aim to 
measure and what they actually measure. This explanation could be explored by refining the 
metric, perhaps through isolating exclusively visual absorption (as opposed to multi-modal 
absorption) for visually-exclusive stimuli. However, the fact that none of the other absorption 
categories were flagged for significance should elicit caution before dismissing the use of the 
metric. After all, the category “nature and language” seems just as likely a candidate for 
correlation when the items being discussed are articulations of the experience of viewing a 
natural phenomenon. Likewise, one might assume that a tendency toward “imaginative 
involvement” would play a role in the experience of viewing a simulation. So, one must take 
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seriously the second explanation. The relationships between these constructs should be more 
closely examined to parse out the structural commonalities for AWCH, and the other spiritual, 
religious, and aesthetic constructs.  
A similar relational issue is raised by the phenomenological results of religious-
experiencers self-identifying as less “reflective persons”. For example, P4, demonstrated alpha-
suppression, did not articulate spiritual experiences, and also identified as “reflective”. What is 
the relationship between considering oneself reflective and a decreased likelihood of speaking in 
religious terms? First, one must take seriously methodological points that should be addressed to 
validate these findings (e.g. replication, larger data samples). However, the 
neurophenomenological approach can take existing findings as directions for ontological 
refinement. For example, the data presented here can direct further phenomenological analysis 
into the role of meta-cognitive factors (like reflection) in real-time experience. Meta-cognition as 
a broad category was not part of the hermeneutic analysis from the original astronaut texts, but 
the current findings implicate contributions from neural correlates for working and episodic 
memory. Pieced together, meta-cognitive features from the psychological, physiological, and 
phenomenological data sources can be used to create a clearer picture of spiritual and aesthetic 
experiences. Beyond the methodological and ontological questions raised, these correlations 
suggest that the structure of experience may also be a function of narrative capacity and social 
norms. A “reflective” person may be more inclined to take time before articulating an 
experience, particularly to a stranger and especially in terms that may be considered intimate or 
culturally charged, such as AWCH. Reflection, in and of itself, may interfere with immediate 
articulation, but might render a richer account over time. The present study has offered insight 
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into the specific spiritual and aesthetic experiences, but it has also contributed to the larger 
phenomenological project by bringing to light relationships between categories. 
Mechanisms of Experience 
The interviews did successfully create clusters for analysis and these clusters, as reflected 
in neurophysiological data, indicate mechanisms involved in experience. The clusters were 
particularly critical for interpreting the physiological data in individuals. The “experiencers” 
identified by the transcript analyses used as examples in the present paper would not have been 
identified by the ESSE (a traditional psychological survey). The trends visible in the individual 
differences analyses of brain behaviors in correlation with the phenomenological reports of 
aesthetic and spiritual constructs revealed a compelling case for the role of alpha brain activity 
differences. More recently, the alpha behaviors have been linked to a gating or inhibition of areas 
not related to a task (Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 2007). The 
results indicate that the phenomenologically-determined categories of AWCH can be used to 
cluster the participants into groups that coincide with distinct neural behaviors. In this case, the 
greater alpha-suppression rates in the “experiencers” indicate the broader cortical activation 
required to synthesize consciousness, perception, and working memory. While the results of this 
form of analysis are not considered generalizable to the population, they suggest that some 
individuals may exploit the neural interactions facilitated by alpha suppression. The higher 
degree of neural interaction may be linked to the subsequent articulation of experience in 
spiritual terms. 
It cannot go unmentioned that some participants with high alpha suppression did not 
discuss their experiences in spiritual or aesthetic terms. This is not surprising, as the picture of 
experience that has taken shape from this study is far more complex that a one-to-one 
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physiological-phenomenological corollary. P4, who demonstrated alpha-suppression, but did not 
articulate a spiritual experience during interview, indicated in the ESSE that he did experience 
wonder, curiosity, and humility. He also indicated on the ESSE that the simulation felt familiar 
and self-identified as a “reflective person” and “logical person”. Because the information on P4’s 
experience was collected from the three lenses, it fits into the model of experience being a multi-
dimensional phenomenon. In addition to the roles described above, alpha oscillations are also 
implicated in active processing related to memory maintenance (Palva & Palva, 2007). Knowing 
that P4 experienced familiarity (a demand on memory), it is not a surprise to see the alpha 
findings. This may also indicate a difference between experiencing and articulating experience. 
P4’s self-identification as logical and reflective may decrease the likeliness for religious 
articulations (this is discussed in more detail below). While the phenomenological interview is a 
powerful tool, and it successfully led to clusters of data otherwise not available, like the other 
lenses, it is optimized through integration with other tools in the neurophenomenological suite. It 
was the cohesive NP applied herein that generated these insights into the nature and structure of 
experience through testing the present research hypotheses. 
Revisiting the Hypotheses and Objectives 
Returning to the Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis postulated a significant experiential difference between the 
participants who received the FOC condition and those who received the GLO condition. This 
hypothesis was not supported, as no significance was found between the first person reports of 
experience as gathered in the ESSE. However, the second hypothesis (that there would be a 
significant difference between the groups in neurophysical response) was confirmed. This 
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disconnect makes more sense when integrating the data from the phenomenological, 
psychological and neurophysiological lenses. The observed differences in the neurophysiology 
are only part of the experience, as there is a complex interplay between the body, the stimulus, 
executive functioning and memory. The third hypothesis that AWCH experiencers will correlate 
with neurophysiological responses was confirmed with the examination of individual 
differences, as those analyses indicate trends comparing experiencers to non-experiencers. 
These hypotheses rest within the larger methodological question; can methodological 
adjustments refine NP so that experiential research projects may be expanded to support the 
project of understanding experience? Again, the present study suggests concerted efforts can 
drive a research agenda with replicable techniques in an interdisciplinary context. The methods 
described within this project are replicable, so that the project may have future expansions. It 
should be noted that the categories of “experiencer” or “non-experiencer” would have been 
absolutely different had the analysis relied exclusively on the self-reports in the psychological 
survey. As Figure 19 shows, the participants identified as “experiencers” (P14 &44) in the 
phenomenological analysis would not have been categorized as such based on their survey alone; 
the “non-experiencers” also would not have been considered in such terms. For example, P14 
gave a score of 12 out of 100 for awe (M = 57.11, SD = 28.288). On the other extreme, P64 
reported a score of 90 in agreement with the experience of awe (M = 57.11, SD = 28.288), and 
100 for wonder (M = 67.75, SD = 25.962) curiosity (M = 75.64, SD = 22.098), and humility (M = 
54.64, SD = 34.015). The following will explain how this contradiction adds to creating a more 





Figure 19. Self-reports of experience in ESSE. P14 and P44 were classified as “experiencers” in 
the phenomenological analysis; P64 and P65 were not. 
 
The methods employed herein generated other challenging results respective of the 
language used to describe spiritual, aesthetic, and religious experiences. Participants who 















“reflective”, an unanticipated finding. However, only six participants spoke in religious terms, 
reducing the power of the statistics for inference. It will be important to consider the role the 
methodology may have played in either reducing the number of people who spoke in these terms 
(e.g. Did the academic environment make it socially inappropriate to speak in theological 
language?). Further, participants who used aesthetic language to describe their experiences had 
significantly lower “sensory perception absorption” scores. Likewise, “Awe” included 
hermeneutic categories of being captured by the view or lost in the image, items that would 
typically be tightly associated with the TAS category of “sensory perceptual absorption”. At 
first, these appear in opposition to the hermeneutic categories regarding perception as an aspect 
of aesthetic experience. At closer examination, the questions of the TAS focus on potentially 
synesthetic qualities (e.g. “Textures- such as wool, sand, wood- sometimes remind me of colors 
and music. Textures- such as wool, sand, wood- sometimes remind me of colors and music”). 
The apparent disconnect between the hermeneutic analyses and the psychometrics support the 
integration of these tools used in the present study. It is the method of combined NP approaches 
that allowed for the research to identify specific areas, including the language categories, that 
need refinement from multiple disciplinary angles. Future work can help inform better 
psychological tools for capturing experience while also contributing to the philosophical 
examination of the categories used for the present work. 
Returning to the Objectives 
The present work applied the methodological lessons derived from a baseline experiment 
to an experiment using a simulation environment to elicit spiritual and aesthetic experiences and 
compare the subsequent findings from the present experiment to the baseline discussed in the 
literature review. The lessons learned shaped the methodology described above and the 
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consequential results helped clarify some issues that were unclear in the baseline study. One of 
the original concerns was over the theta findings, which resisted interpretation due to the 
ambiguity between contemplative/meditative and fatigue/drowsiness theta behaviors. Because 
the experiment was designed to take fatigue into account (according to Lesson #2), confidence in 
the interpretation of theta differences is greater. Further, the integration of the disciplinary lenses 
(Lesson #1) to create the dyadic analysis for interpreting data allowed for more precise clustering 
and cross-checking of results across domains. Lesson #3, in its observation of the training trade-
off, does not lend itself toward a statistical comparison to the first experiment. Rather, this is a 
theoretical contribution that takes into account the role of “the other” in assisting the reflection 
required for the articulation of experience. Therefore, in lieu of a statistical metric of comparison 
for this aspect of the methodology, one can consider that the interview as practiced in the present 
study provided were more consistent and controlled, improving the collection of first-person data 
as evidenced in the volume collected and reported on in Chapter Four and its contribution to the 
project as a whole. This returns the present work to the starting point, a serious consideration of 
the value of the methodological changes to the study of experience. 
As a whole, the lessons learned from the baseline did not generate a radically different 
toolset, but refined existing ones, so the data collected grew in breadth and depth. The 
application of lessons learned helped direct the interpretation of the results in a manner 
contributes to the study of experience. Table 4 shows some key features of the baseline 
experiment and the counterpart changes in the present study, demonstrating how interpretive 




















Determining the role 
of multiple variables 
as contributors to 
experience 





reduced sensory stimuli 
could elicit experiences 














theta associated with 
tiredness vs. 
meditation 
 Cortical responses 






Clarification of theta 
involvement. Role of 
MEMORY, particularly 
engaged in context 
 Cortical beta 
responses 
differed between 
the earth and 
deep space 
conditions 
The baseline found 
beta activity, 
associated with 
arousal, but could not 
determine whether 
the visual cues alone 
were eliciting the 
arousal 
 Differences in self-
identification as a 
logical or spiritual 





Clarification of beta, as 
the groups had 
equitable levels of 
sensory arousal. Role of 
PERCEPTION as an 
individually unique 
process 





compared to the 
deep space 
condition 
No indication of the 
mechanisms involved 
in the generation of 
AWCH 











Results suggest that 






interaction of brain 








Could not examine 
the role of real-time 
online executive 
functions 


















The limitations of the present study fall into three categories: analysis, the role of the 
interviewer, and the role of embodiment.  
The present work reflects the findings from three disciplinary lenses: psychology, 
neurophysiology, and philosophy; while this triad has yielded compelling results, the method of 
paired analysis between the disciplines is novel. Future studies should include alternative 
analytic approaches. For example, the psychological analysis could take account of intensity of 
experience. Further, the impressions of the interviewer may be of particular value. In the context 
of interaction, the phenomenological interview allows for participatory sense-making (De 
Jaegher & Paolo, 2007). As such, the impressions of the interview in respect to the participant’s 
experience may be valuable. Future clarifications in the hermeneutic categories and the methods 
used to identify them in first-person accounts should be clearly articulated and rigorously applied 
in other studies to develop a consistent and reliable means for interpreting experience. Finally, 
the role of the body in experience cannot be over-emphasized. The visual stimulus restricted, by 
design, interaction. As such, one should exercise restraint in generalizing the results to 
circumstances in which the participant is interacting more directly with the environment until 
further investigation warrants. The aforementioned limitations all pertain to potential 
improvements on future experiments or caution for the interpretation of the present results, but 
they in no measure undermine the value of the present study as it thoroughly tested each 




The realm of the spiritual poses profound problems for research; present study included. 
William James, philosopher, psychologist, and physician, took on the problem of this kind of 
experience in The Varieties of Religious Experience (James, 1902). His findings, over a century 
ago, align in some ways to the highly personal picture that the present study paints, but they stop 
short of explaining the nature and structure of these experiences. According to William James, 
religion is something of a work of egoism, in that, there is a level in which some are fortunate 
enough to be called, chosen, or otherwise receive revelation. Egoism may be part of the present 
account as well, only so much as it ties into the complex interplay of mind and body. For 
example, there may be those who see the world in an exclusive manner. However, what the data 
indicates is not James’ so-called “dreams, hallucinations, revelations, and cock-and-bull stories” 
(near footnote 335). Rather, these differences in perception, manifested in experiential accounts, 
reflect real varieties of experience. The present study and its results suggest that religious and 
spiritual differences (observed in the laboratory and the world at large) are not the result of pure 
imagination, but the manifestations of complex interactive systems including executive function, 
memory, consciousness, and perception. 
How can a stripped-down, straight-forward single-stimulus experiment tell us anything 
about the textured, rich, and complex experiences of astronauts? Are we attempting to learn 
about the nuances of a delicate soufflé from studying the composition of an egg? To follow that 
analogy, if we only looked at the egg, it wouldn’t tell us anything about the soufflé. Yet, if we 
examined the soufflé from the start, it might follow that we could begin to examine the 
ingredients individually and then look at how those ingredients interacted with one another. 
Then, as we put the ingredients back together, we would begin to see how different ratios and 
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slight substitutions begin to create a plethora of goods, from crackers, to cakes, to papier-mâché 
paste. No one would suggest that knowledge of the egg is sufficient, but anyone who has made a 
soufflé will attest that it is essential to understand how that egg behaves in relationship to air, 
flour, and heat if you want to make any sense of the delectable soufflé. 
This provides an analogy, though inherently limited, in which to explain the way I have 
isolated one component of the astronaut experience (viewing the earth from space) to explore 
that component’s role in the spiritual experiences of astronauts. The inquiry begins, and 
continues, anchored in the fact that actual astronaut experience is accessible, describable, and 
subject to empirical investigation. It was with those experiences that the study began, using the 
hermeneutic analysis to frame the problem at hand. The visual component of the astronaut 
experience is only one component, something mentioned explicitly by astronauts and something 
possible to simulate in a laboratory. However, in isolation of that one controllable stimulus, it 
becomes possible to take a closer look at its relationship with the factors individuals bring to 
their experiences. The results indicate that the nature of astronaut experiences is not any different 
from any other human experiences. That is, the nature, the structures and tendencies of the 
experiences themselves, are like other experiences in that they are a function of dynamic 
interactions of cognitive, affective, and physiological engagement in the world. In the case of 
astronauts, their prior knowledge is complex. The demands on astronaut bodies are remarkable, 
with extreme sensations in sound, touch, and sight. Yet, with all of the extraordinary 
components, the ways in which the experiences emerge can be considered as extensions of 
ordinary human experience. What takes shape is the dynamic relationship between histories, 
bodies, and environment. In the present study, emphasizing the role of visual perception in 
relationship to context revealed phenomenological nuances of experience that would have gone 
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unnoticed in traditional cognitive science. Subsequently, these relationships can be mapped to a 
model of experience, directly contributing to the project of phenomenology and supporting the 
larger inquiry into the study of mind, moving us closer to understanding the nature of 











Are you less than 18 years old?
Are you greater than 40 years old?
Have you had any caffeine in the last 2 hours?
Have you had any nicotine in the last 2 hours? 
Have you had any alcohol in the last 24 hours? 
Have you had any sedatives or tranquilizers in the last 24 hours?
Have you had any aspirin, tylenol, or similar medications in the last 24 hours? 
Have you had any antihistamines or decongestants in the last 24 hours? 
Have you had any anti-psychotics or anti-depressants in the last 24 hours? 
Based on your current knowledge, are you pregnant? 
Do you have any metal plates in your head? 
Do you lack normal or corrected to normal vision?
Are you colorblind?
Do you feel moderate discomfort, dizziness, fatigue, headache, eye 
strain, difficulty focusing, increased salivation, sweating, nausea, 
difficulty consentrating, fullness of head, blurred vision, vertigo, 
stomach awareness or burping?
It is ok to run if this is checked. Please 
ask participant to clarify.
Do you have a history of epilepsy or seizures?
Do you have wet or woven hair?
Are you currently in the military?
Answering "Left" or "Either" to questions below may prohibit participation in the study
Yes NO
Do you have any impairment of your dominant arm or hand? Must be right handed
Are you right handed? 
Left Right Either
Which hand do you use to write with?
Which hand do you use to throw a ball?                   If more than one do not run. 
Which hand do you hold a toothbrush with? 
Which hand holds a knife when you cut things?
Which hand holds a hammer when you nail things? 
If more than one of these is checked 
do not run participant. But one check 
is ok to run. Please ask participant to 
clarify when substance was taken. If 
close (within 15 minutes or so) to the 
time period, then run participant.
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Tellegen Absorption Scale  
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974) 
This questionnaire consists of questions about experiences that you may have had in your 
life. We are interested in how often you have these experiences. It is important, however, that 
your answers show how often these experiences happen to you when you are not under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs. All questions are True/False. 
1. Sometimes I feel and experience things as I did when I was a child.  
2. I can be greatly moved by eloquent or poetic language.   
3. While watching a movie, a TV show, or play, I may become so involved that I may 
forget about myself and my surroundings and experience the movie as if it were real 
and as if I were taking part in it.   
4. If I stare at a picture and then look away from it, I can sometimes “see” an image of 
the picture almost as if I were still looking at it.   
5. Sometimes I feel as if my mind could envelop the whole world.   
6. I like to watch cloud shapes change in the sky.   
7. If I wish I can imagine (or daydream) some things so vividly that they hold my 
attention as a good movie or story does.   
8. I think I really know what some people mean when they talk about mystical 
experiences.  
9. I sometimes “step outside” my usual self and experience an entirely different state of 
being.  
10. Textures- such as wool, sand, wood- sometimes remind me of colors and music.       
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11. Sometimes I experience things as if they were doubly real.   
12. When I listen to music I can get so caught up in it that I don’t notice anything else.  
13. If I wish I can imagine that my body is so heavy that I could not move it if I wanted 
to.  
14. I can often somehow sense the presence of another person before I can actually see or 
hear her/him. 
15. The crackle and flames of wood fire stimulate my imagination. 
16. It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and to 
feel as if my whole state of consciousness has somehow been temporarily altered.   
17. Different colors have distinctive and special meanings for me.   
18. I am able to wander off into my thoughts while doing a routine task and actually 
forget that I am doing the task, and find a few minutes later that I have completed it.   
19. I can sometimes recollect certain past experiences in my life with such clarity and 
vividness that it is like living them again or almost so.  
20. Things that might seem meaningless to others often make sense to me. 
21. While acting in a play I think I could really feel the emotions of the character and 
“become” her/him for the time being, forgetting both myself and the audience.  
22. My thoughts often don’t occur as words but as visual images.   
23. I often take delight in small thing (like the five-pointed star shape that appears when 
you cut an apple across the core or the colors of soap bubbles).   
24. When listening to organ music or other powerful music I sometimes feel as if I am 
being lifted into the air. 
25. Sometimes I can change noise into music by the way I listen to it.  
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26. Some of my most vivid memories are called up by scents and smells.  
27. Some music reminds me of pictures or changing color patterns.  
28. I often know what someone is going to say before he or she says it.  
29. I often have “physical memories”; for example, after I have been swimming I may 
still feel as if I am in the water. 
30. The sound of a voice can be so fascinating to me that I can just go on listening to it.   
31. At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there.  
32. Sometimes thoughts and images come to me without the slightest effort.   
33. I find that different odors have different colors.   
34.  I can be deeply moved by a sunset.   
Scoring 
 
Sum of all items. No items are reversed scored. Broken into 5 factors: 
 
1. Sensory/Perceptual Absorption 
a. Items # 10, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 33 
2. Intuition 
a. Items # 14, 19, 20, 28, 30, 31, 32 
3. Imaginative Involvement 
a. Items # 3, 4, 7, 12, 18, 21, 22 
4. Trance 
a. Items # 5, 8, 9, 11, 13 
5. Nature and Language 
a. Items # 1, 2, 6, 23, 34 
 
Multiple Stimulus Types Ambiguity Tolerance 
(McLain, 2009) 
Scale: 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Somewhat Disagree 
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3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4 = Somewhat Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
Items 
1. I don’t tolerate ambiguous situations well.                                               
2. I find it difficult to respond when faced with an unexpected event.                                              
3. I don’t think new situations are any more threatening than familiar situations.                                               
4. I’m drawn to situations which can be interpreted in more than one way.                                               
5. I would rather avoid solving a problem that must be viewed from several different 
perspectives.                                              
6. I try to avoid situations which are ambiguous.                                              
7. I am good at managing unpredictable situations.                                              
8. I prefer similar situations to new ones.                                              
9. Problems which cannot be considered from just one point of view are a little 
threatening.                                                
10. I avoid situations which are too complicated for me to easily understand.                                              
11. I am tolerant of ambiguous situations.                                              
12. I enjoy tackling problems which are complex enough to be ambiguous.                                              
13. I try to avoid problems which don’t seem to have only one “best” solution.                                              
14. I often find myself looking for something new, rather than trying to hold things 
constant in my life.                                              
15. I generally prefer novelty over familiarity.                                              
16. I dislike ambiguous situations.                                              
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17. Some problems are so complex that just trying to understand them is fun.                                              
18. I have little trouble coping with unexpected events.                                              
19. I pursue problem situations which are so complex some people call them “mind 
boggling.”                                              
20. I find it hard to make a choice when the outcome is uncertain.                                              
21. I enjoy an occasional surprise.                                              
22. I prefer a situation in which there is some ambiguity.               
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Brief Multidimensional Measure of Religiousness/Spirituality  
(Idler et al., 2003) 
1. I feel God’s presence. 
1 - Many times a day 
2 - Every day 
3 - Most days 
4 - Some days 
5 - Once in a while 
6 - Never or almost never 
2. I find strength and comfort in my religion. 
1 - Many times a day 
2 - Every day 
3 - Most days 
4 - Some days 
5 - Once in a while 
6 - Never or almost never 
3. I feel deep inner peace or harmony. 
1 - Many times a day 
2 - Every day 
3 - Most days 
4 - Some days 
5 - Once in a while 
6 - Never or almost never 
120 
 
4. I desire to be closer to or in union with God. 
1 - Many times a day 
2 - Every day 
3 - Most days 
4 - Some days 
5 - Once in a while 
6 - Never or almost never 
5. I feel God’s love for me, directly or through others. 
1 - Many times a day 
2 - Every day 
3 - Most days 
4 - Some days 
5 - Once in a while 
6 - Never or almost never 
6. I am spiritually touched by the beauty of creation. 
1 - Many times a day 
2 - Every day 
3 - Most days 
4 - Some days 
5 - Once in a while 
6 - Never or almost never 
7. I believe in a God who watches over me. 
1 - Strongly agree 
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2 - Agree 
3 – Disagree 
4 - Strongly disagree 
8. I feel a deep sense of responsibility for reducing pain and suffering in the world. 
1 - Strongly agree 
2 - Agree 
3 – Disagree 
4 - Strongly disagree 
9. I try hard to carry my religious beliefs over into all my other dealings in life. 
1 - Strongly agree 
2 - Agree 
3 – Disagree 
4 - Strongly disagree 
10. Because of my religious or spiritual beliefs I have forgiven myself for things that I have done 
wrong. 
1 - Always or almost always 
2 - Often 
3 – Seldom 
4 – Never 
11. Because of my religious or spiritual beliefs I have forgiven those who hurt me  
1 - Always or almost always 
2 - Often 
3 – Seldom 
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4 - Never 
12. Because of my religious or spiritual beliefs I know that God forgives me.  
1 - Always or almost always 
2 - Often 
3 – Seldom 
4 - Never 
13. How often do you pray privately; that is, how often do you pray in settings other than a 
church, synagogue, mosque or other place of worship and at times when you are not attending 
functions of a religiously based group?  
1 - More than once a day 
2 - Once a day 
3 - A few times a week 
4 - Once a week 
5 - A few times a month 
6 - Once a month 
7 - Less than once a month 
8 – Never 
14. Within your religious or spiritual tradition, how often do you meditate? 
1 - More than once a day 
2 - Once a day 
3 - A few times a week 
4 - Once a week 
5 - A few times a month 
123 
 
6 - Once a month 
7 - Less than once a month 
8 - Never 
15. How often do you watch or listen to religious programs on TV or radio? 
1 - More than once a day 
2 - Once a day 
3 - A few times a week 
4 - Once a week 
5 - A few times a month 
6 - Once a month 
7 - Less than once a month 
8 - Never 
16. How often do you read sacred religious texts (e.g., Bible, Torah, Talmud, Koran, etc.) or 
other religious literature?  
1 - More than once a day 
2 - Once a day 
3 - A few times a week 
4 - Once a week 
5 - A few times a month 
6 - Once a month 
7 - Less than once a month 
8 – Never 
17. How often are prayers or grace said before or after meals in your home? 
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1 - At all meals 
2 - Once a day 
3 - At least once a week 
4 - Only on special occasions 
5 - Never 
18. I think about how my life is part of a larger spiritual force. 
1 - A great deal 
2 - Quite a bit 
3 – Somewhat 
4 - Not at all 
19. I work together with God as partners. 
1 - A great deal 
2 - Quite a bit 
3 - Somewhat 
4 - Not at all 
20. I look to God for strength, support, and guidance. 
1 - A great deal 
2 - Quite a bit 
3 - Somewhat 
4 - Not at all 
21. I feel God is punishing me for my sins or lack of spirituality. 
1 - A great deal 
2 - Quite a bit 
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3 - Somewhat 
4 - Not at all 
22. I wonder whether God has abandoned me. 
1 - A great deal 
2 - Quite a bit 
3 - Somewhat 
4 - Not at all 
23. I try to make sense of the situation and decide what to do without relying on God. 
1 - A great deal 
2 - Quite a bit 
3 - Somewhat 
4 - Not at all 
24. To what extent is your religion involved in understanding or dealing with stressful situations 
in any way? 
1 - Very involved 
2 - Somewhat involved 
3 - Not very involved 
4 - Not involved at all 
25. If you were ill, how much would the people in your congregation help you out? 
1 - A great deal 
2 - Some 
3 - A little 
4 – None 
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26. If you had a problem or were faced with a difficult situation, how much comfort would the 
people in your congregation be willing to give you? 
1 - A great deal 
2 - Some 
3 - A little 
4 – None 
27. How often do the people in your congregation make too many demands on you? 
1 - Very often 
2 - Fairly often 
3 - Once in a while 
4 - Never 
28. How often are the people in your congregation critical of you and the things you do? 
1 - Very often 
2 - Fairly often 
3 - Once in a while 
4 – Never 
29. How often do you go to religious services? 
1 - More than once a week 
2 - Every week or more often 
3 - Once or twice a month 
4 - Every month or so 
5 - Once or twice a year 
6 - Never 
127 
 
30. Besides religious services, how often do you take part in other activities of a religious nature? 
1 - More than once a week 
2 - Every week or more often 
3 - Once or twice a month 
4 - Every month or so 
5 - Once or twice a year 
6 – Never 
31. The events in my life unfold according to a divine or greater plan. 
1 - Strongly agree 
2 - Agree 
3 - Disagree 
4 - Strongly disagree 
32. I have a sense of mission or calling in my own life. 
1 - Strongly agree 
2 - Agree 
3 - Disagree 
4 - Strongly disagree 
33. To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person? 
1 - Very religious 
2 - Moderately religious 
3 - Slightly religious 
4 - Not religious at all 
34. To what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person? 
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1 - Very spiritual 
2 - Moderately spiritual 
3 - Slightly spiritual 
4 - Not spiritual at all 
 
Experiment-Specific Survey of Experience 
Please answer each of the questions to your best ability. 
STOP!  The research assistant must verify that your PARTICIPANT IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER is entered correctly.   
 
Demographics Questionnaire for Viewing Earth from Space: First-Person Experiences 
 
What is your sex?  
Male  
Female  
What is your age?  
 
What is the HIGHEST level of education you have COMPLETED?  
High School  
Associates Degree or 2 years of College/University  
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Bachelors Degree  
Masters Degree  
Doctoral Degree  
When did you use computers in your education? Select all that apply.  
Preschool  
Grade School  
Junior High/ Middle School  
High School  
Technical School  
College  
Did not use  
What is your major?  
 
What is your minor? Please enter "NA" if you don't have one. 
 
 




No (please explain)  




Other (specify)  
Do not use  
Is English your native (first) language?  
Yes  
No  
At what age did you begin speaking English?  
 





Would you consider yourself a fluent reader of English?  
Yes  
No  
Do you typically understand spoken English without difficulty?   
Yes  
No  
What was your first language?  
 




























Which of the following best describes your expertise with computers?  
Novice  
Good with one type of software package (such as word processing or slide shows)  
Good with several software packages  
Can program in one language and use several software packages  
Can program in several languages and use several software packages  
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Which types of computer/video games do you most often play? Select all that apply.  
Action (First person shooter, fighting, etc.)  
Adventure, Real-time 3D  
Role Playing (including MMOs)  
Simulation (Sims, Civilization, etc.)  
Strategy/Puzzle  
Party, dance, or music  
Sports  
Other  









Which of the following amusement/entertainment sites have you visited?  
Disney parks (i.e. Disneyworld, Disneyland, Euro-Disney)  
Disney Quest  
Universal Studios/ Islands of Adventure  
Kennedy Space Center  
Busch Gardens  
Sea World  
Six Flags  




You have completed the demographic portion of this questionnaire.  Wait for the research 
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assistant to give you further instructions. 
 
Research Assistant Code  
 
The Research Assistant will read the following aloud. Wait until it is read before 
continuing: 
 
The following questions will help us interpret the results from your interview and physical 
readings more accurately. We will be looking especially at indicators of emotional 
experiences. To help you describe your experience, we ask that you make the following 
distinctions: 
 
When we use the word AWE, we mean: a direct and initial feeling when faced with something 
incomprehensible or sublime. 
 
When we use the word WONDER, we mean: a more reflective feeling one has when unable to 
put things back into a familiar conceptual framework. 
 
When we use the word CURIOSITY, we mean: wanting to know, see, experience, understand 
more. 
 














Which best describes your experience? 
I experienced AWE the MOST when viewing...  
close images of the Earth (toward the beginning of the video).  
distant images of the Earth (toward the end of the video).  
the images of the geometric shape.  
Which best describes your experience? 
I experienced WONDER the MOST when viewing...  
close images of the Earth (toward the beginning of the video).  
distant images of the Earth (toward the end of the video).  
the images of the geometric shape.  
Which best describes your experience? 
I experienced CURIOSITY the MOST when viewing...  
close images of the Earth (toward the beginning of the video).  
distant images of the Earth (toward the end of the video).  
the images of the geometric shape.  
Which best describes your experience? 
I experienced HUMILITY the MOST when viewing...  
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close images of the Earth (toward the beginning of the video).  
distant images of the Earth (toward the end of the video).  
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Guide for Phenomenological Interview 
Objective: The phenomenological interview seeks to draw out first -person 
experience, emotionally and physically.  
Do Example 
Encourage open-mindedness (this 
begins EARLY in the experiment) 
 
Whatever is your honest 
experience is what we are looking for. 
Don’t worry about what you think 
you should say or should have 
experienced. 
Ask open questions What was that like? Did you feel 
anything then? 
How did you know that…? 
Attend to gesture 
 
What does this mean when you 
move your hands like that?  
Can you show me, where you saw 
this? 
Ask for time-related experiences 
 
You said…, was there anything 
you remember happening before that? 
What happens next? 
Move to present tense So, let’s go back to the moment 
you noticed the stars. What is happening 




Use reflective language I’m going to repeat back what you 
said. Feel free to interrupt me to correct 
something or add anything to what I say. 
Don’t  
Focus on judgments, rationalization, 
and opinions 
 
Instead of saying, “Cool” or 
“That’s interesting”, try, “I understand 
that you were excited. What does that feel 
like? “ 
Ask leading or loaded questions 
(ones that offer potential answers) 
Instead of “were you bored?” or 
“did you see the stars pulse?” try, 
“describe the way you felt at the 
beginning…middle…end” and “tell me 
more about the visual experience.” 
Try to fill the quiet Give the participant time to reflect. 
Give yourself time to collect your 
thoughts so that you do not say something 
impulsively. 
Sample opening: 
Now we are going to talk about your experiences while viewing the simulation. We are 
interested in your unique experience, what it was like to see what you saw. During our 
conversation, I will repeat things I hear, just to make sure that I understand what you mean. The 
interview will probably last for about 30 minutes. 
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Let’s start by going back to the beginning of the simulations and outlining for me what 
you experienced. 
So you mentioned…what did that feel like? 
When was that? 
Did anything feel familiar? 
When the interview time is up (approximately 30 minutes), say thank you and 
let the participant know that you have some survey questions.  
Example closing: 
I appreciate you sharing your experience with me. There is one final step, which is to 








The following reflects the refinement and maturation of the experiential categories as 
throughout the hermeneutic process. These are entirely from the unpublished notes of Drs. Shaun 
Gallagher (Lillian and Morrie Moss Chair of Excellence in Philosophy, University of Memphis; 
Research Professor of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, University of Hertfordshire, UK) and 
Bruce Janz (Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy, University of Central 
Florida). The shifts within the enumeration and relationships correspond with the ongoing 
analysis researchers collaborate to better understand the nature and structure of spiritual, 
religious, and aesthetic experiences. 
Concrete Categories 
Initial consensus list  
1. Appreciation (aesthetic; aesthetic impression; vs. intellectual appreciation) 
2. Brotherhood 
3. Captured by view/ drawn to phenomenon 
4. Change (external) 
5. Change (internal) 
6. Closing down of curiosity 
7. Confirming of perspective 




12. [Drawn to the phenomenon= 3] 
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13. Dream-like (feeling of unreality) 
14. Elation 
15. Emotional (general) 
16. Empathy 
17. Experience-hungry (wanting more, setting up to have experience, positive about 
taking risk of exploring; captured by possibilities of exploring)  
18. Fascination (getting lost in object) 
19. Floating (bodily – related to weightlessness) 




24. Home, feeling of being at…  
25. Inspired 
26. Intellectual (Rich descript. of objects; none of his feelings; order; analytic 
appreciation; appreciation of complexity) 
27. Joy 
28. Love  
29. Minimal affect 
30. Moral implications 
31. Nostalgia (Anticipated) 
32. Overwhelmed  -- loss for words, etc. 
33. Perspectival change (spatial) 
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34. Perspectival shift (moral) 
35. Physiological response (internal bodily changes) 
36. Peace 
37. Pleasure 
38. Poetic expression 
39. Responsibility (towards others) 
40. Sensory (visual, silence) 
41. Sensory overload (heightened sensory awareness) 
42. Surprise 
43. Unity-with (feeling of oneness with; holistic feeling, melting into everything).  
44. Unity of external (earth, universe, people on earth, oneness of everything; 
interrelatedness/ complex unity) 
45. Sublime 
46. Totality (wholeness of what is experienced) 
47. Vastness of ... (universe;Feeling of smallness within the vast) 
48. Worry (about the earth) 
Verified list of 37 categories  
(verified by 6 grad students and 5 undergrads in blind reviews)  
 Appreciation (aesthetic; aesthetic impression; vs. intellectual appreciation) 
 Intellectual (Rich descript. of objects; none of his feelings; order; analytic 
appreciation; appreciation of complexity) 
 Captured by view/ drawn to phenomenon 
 Overwhelmed  -- loss for words, etc. 
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 Poetic expression 
 Sensory (visual, silence) 
 Perspectival change (spatial) 
 Surprise 
 Vastness of ... (universe; Feeling of smallness within the vast) 
 Pleasure 
 Fascination (getting lost in object) 
 Unity of external (earth, universe, people on earth, oneness of everything; 
interrelatedness/ complex unity) 
 Dream-like (feeling of unreality) 
 Elation 
 Floating in void (not related to weightlessness) 
 Sublime 
 Curiosity 
 Moral implications 
 Experience-hungry (wanting more, setting up to have experience, positive about 
taking risk of exploring; captured by possibilities of exploring)  
 Perspectival shift (moral) 
 Fulfillment 
 Floating(bodily - related to weightlessness) 




 Nostalgia (Anticipated) 
 Sensory overload (heightened sensory awareness) 
 Change (internal) 
 Joy 
 Peace 
 Responsibility (towards others) 
 Contentment 
 Disorientation 
 Emotional (general) 
 Totality (wholeness of what is experienced) 
 Brotherhood 
 Connected (feeling connected with, but different from, everything - cf unity) 
 Unity-with (feeling of oneness with; holistic feeling, melting into everything).   
Verified list of 37 with original numeration.  
1.    Appreciation (aesthetic; aesthetic impression; vs. intellectual appreciation) 
26.  Intellectual (Rich descript. of objects; none of his feelings; order; analytic 
appreciation; appreciation of complexity) 
3.    Captured by view/ drawn to phenomenon 
32.  Overwhelmed  -- loss for words, etc. 
38.  Poetic expression 
40.  Sensory (visual, silence) 
33.  Perspectival change (spatial) 
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42.  Surprise 
47.  Vastness of ... (universe; Feeling of smallness within the vast) 
37.  Pleasure 
18.  Fascination (getting lost in object) 
44.  Unity of external (earth, universe, people on earth, oneness of everything; 
interrelatedness/ complex unity) 
13.  Dream-like (feeling of unreality) 
14.  Elation 
20.  Floating in void (not related to weightlessness) 
45.  Sublime 
10.  Curiosity 
30.  Moral implications 
17.  Experience-hungry (wanting more, setting up to have experience, positive about 
taking risk of exploring; captured by possibilities of exploring)  
34.  Perspectival shift (moral) 
22.  Fulfillment 
19.  Floating (bodily - related to weightlessness) 
24.  Home, feeling of being at… ,  
25.  Inspired 
31.  Nostalgia (Anticipated) 
41.  Sensory overload (heightened sensory awareness) 
5.    Change (internal) 
27.  Joy 
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36.  Peace 
39.  Responsibility (towards others) 
9.    Contentment 
11.  Disorientation 
15.  Emotional (general) 
46.  Totality (wholeness of what is experienced) 
2.    Brotherhood 
8.    Connected (feeling connected with, but different from, everything - cf unity) 
43.  Unity-with (feeling of oneness with; holistic feeling, melting into everything). 
Verified list of 37 categories numerically reordered. 
1.    Appreciation (aesthetic; aesthetic impression; vs. intellectual appreciation) 
2.    Brotherhood 
3.    Captured by view/ drawn to phenomenon 
5.    Change (internal) 
8.    Connected (feeling connected with, but different from, everything - cf unity) 
9.    Contentment 
10.  Curiosity  
11.  Disorientation 
14.  Elation  
15.  Emotional (general) 
17.  Experience-hungry (wanting more, setting up to have experience, positive about 
taking risk of exploring; captured by possibilities of exploring 
18.  Fascination (getting lost in object) 
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19.  Floating (bodily - related to weightlessness) 
20.  Floating in void (not related to weightlessness) 
22.  Fulfillment 
24.  Home, feeling of being at… ,  
25.  Inspired 
26.  Intellectual (Rich descript. of objects; none of his feelings; order; analytic   
appreciation; appreciation of complexity) 
27.  Joy 
30.  Moral implications 
31.  Nostalgia (Anticipated) 
32.  Overwhelmed  -- loss for words, etc. 
33.  Perspectival change (spatial) 
34.  Perspectival shift (moral) 
36.  Peace 
37.  Pleasure 
38.  Poetic expression 
39.  Responsibility (towards others) 
40.  Sensory (visual, silence) 
42.  Surprise 
43.  Unity-with (feeling of oneness with; holistic feeling, melting into everything).  
44.  Unity of external (earth, universe, people on earth, oneness of everything; 
interrelatedness/ complex unity) 
45.  Sublime  
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46.  Totality (wholeness of what is experienced) 
47.  Vastness of ... (universe; Feeling of smallness within the vast)13.  Dream-like 
(feeling of unreality) 
41.  Sensory overload (heightened sensory awareness) 
Cross Categorization 
Aesthetic 
1.    Appreciation (aesthetic; aesthetic impression; vs. intellectual appreciation) 
3.    Captured by view/ drawn to phenomenon 
13.  Dream-like (feeling of unreality) 
15.  Emotional (general) 
17.  Experience-hungry (wanting more, setting up to have experience, positive about 
taking risk of exploring; captured by possibilities of exploring 
18.  Fascination (getting lost in object) 
19.  Floating (bodily - related to weightlessness) 
27.  Joy 
36.  Peace 
37.  Pleasure 
38.  Poetic expression 
40.  Sensory (visual, silence) 
45.  Sublime  
46.  Totality (wholeness of what is experienced) 
47.  Vastness of ... (universe; Feeling of smallness within the vast) 
41.  Sensory overload (heightened sensory awareness) 
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43.  Unity-with (feeling of oneness with; holistic feeling, melting into everything). 
Intellectual 
18.  Fascination (getting lost in object) 
26.  Intellectual (Rich descript. of objects; none of his feelings; order; analytic   
appreciation; appreciation of complexity) 
Spiritual 
2.    Brotherhood  
5.    Change (internal) 
8.    Connected (feeling connected with, but different from, everything - cf unity) 
9.    Contentment 
11.  Disorientation 
22.  Fulfillment 
24.  Home, feeling of being at… , 
30.  Moral implications 
31.  Nostalgia (Anticipated) 
34.  Perspectival shift (moral) 
44.  Unity of external (earth, universe, people on earth, oneness of everything; 
interrelatedness/ complex unity) 
39.  Responsibility (towards others) 
Religious  
[explicit mentions of God, creation, etc.] 
43.  Unity-with (feeling of oneness with; holistic feeling, melting into everything). 
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44.  Unity of external (earth, universe, people on earth, oneness of everything; 
interrelatedness/ complex unity) 
Awe 
3.    Captured by view/ drawn to phenomenon 
14.  Elation  
17.  Experience-hungry (wanting more, setting up to have experience, positive about 
taking risk of exploring; captured by possibilities of exploring 
18.  Fascination (getting lost in object) 
32.  Overwhelmed  -- loss for words, etc. 
  42.  Surprise 
  47.  Vastness of ... (universe; Feeling of smallness within the vast) 
Wonder 
25.  Inspired 
30.  Moral implications 
31.  Nostalgia (Anticipated) 
34.  Perspectival shift (moral) 
43.  Unity-with (feeling of oneness with; holistic feeling, melting into everything). 
44.  Unity of external (earth, universe, people on earth, oneness of everything; 
interrelatedness/ complex unity) 
39.  Responsibility (towards others) 
Curiosity 
10.  Curiosity  
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26.  Intellectual (Rich descript. of objects; none of his feelings; order; analytic   
appreciation; appreciation of complexity) 
Humility 
39.  Responsibility (towards others) 
43.  Unity-with (feeling of oneness with; holistic feeling, melting into everything). 
47.  Vastness of ... (universe; Feeling of smallness within the vast) 
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